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The New Casuistry
PAUL R. TREMBLAY*
Of one thing we may be sure. If inquiries are to have substantial basis, if they
are not to be wholly in the air the theorist must take his departure from the
problems which men actually meet in their own conduct. He may define and
refine these; he may divide and systematize; he may abstract the problems from
their concrete contexts in individual lives; he may classify them when he has
thus detached them; but if he gets away from them, he is talking about
something his own brain has invented, not about moral realities.
John Dewey and James Tufts'
[A] "new casuistry" has appeared in which the old "method of cases" has been
revived....
Hugo Adam Bedau
2
I. PRACTICING PHILOSOPHY
Let us suppose, just for the moment, that "plain people ' 3 care about ethics,
that they would prefer, everything else being equal, to do the right thing, or to
lead the good life.4 And let us imagine that lawyers share that sentiment - they
* Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Earlier versions of this Article have been presented
at the Fourth International Clinical Conference sponsored by UCLA School of Law and the Institute for
Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London and held at Lake Arrowhead, CA; at the Boston College
Interdisciplinary Ethics Roundtable; and at an informal colloquium at Boston College Law School. I thank the
participants at those meetings for their comments, questions, and criticisms. I also thank warmly those who
were kind enough to read earlier drafts of this work, and whose reactions have helped me clarify my ideas:
Susan Kupfer, Aaron Mackler, Peter Margulies, Judy McMorrow, Deborah Rhode, Bill Simon, and Fred
Zemans. I have also been blessed with productive research assistants during this project. My thanks to John
Ridge, Johann Lee, Steven Denburg, Amy DeLisa, Christopher Johnson, and Jason Bryan for that help. Finally,
I owe a great debt of gratitude to Deans Avi Soifer and Jim Rogers and to Boston College Law School for
support, both financial and moral, for this effort.
1. JoHN DEWEY & JAMES TuFrs, Ethics 212 (1908).
2. Hugo Adam Bedau, Making Mortal Choices: Three exercises in Moral Casuistry 105 (1997).
3. 1 borrow the "plain person" phrase from Alasdair Maclntyre and Sir David Ross. Alasdair MacIntyre,
Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods, 66 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 3 (1992); W.D. Ross,
THE RiGHT AND THE GOOD 41 (1930).
4. This assumption is one necessary to any inquiry into the quality of ethical decisionmaking. Richard Posner
has written recently that most individuals do not care whether their actions might be deemed correct as
measured by some moral calculus. Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARv. L.
REV. 1637 (1998). This Article is largely sympathetic to Judge Posner's critique of moral theory and his
pragmatic reaction to theory, but it does not share his sentiments about how deeply persons care about doing
what is right. The Kohlberg-derived studies of moral development reveal that individuals generally understand
the compulsions of morality, albeit at varying levels of sophistication. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Into The
Valley Of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Educational Reform, 1995 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139;
Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CUN. L. REV. 505, 506-22
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too would prefer to practice law in an ethical manner, by and large.5 We could
also assume, further, that "ethics" for lawyers means something different from,
and more than, simply following a set of rules established by the legal profession,
rules with obligatory qualities implying penalties for their violation. Many within
the profession seem to think of "legal ethics" as such rule-obligations, but it is
fair for us to assume that ethics can and does mean a lot more.
6
We can readily accept these premises, but doing so implies some benchmark,
(1995); Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking By Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 FLA. L.
REV. 197 (1996). The impassioned presence in our nation's public life of committed moral debate about such
issues as abortion, sexuality and sexual orientation, end-of-life decisions, and the like, further evidence this
assumption. See, e.g., JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991).
In any event, even if my assumption were flawed, it would still be true that some ordinary people care about
the moral character of their lives. With that foundation we may then proceed to explore how those individuals
ought to assess that quality, which is the purpose of this Article. See also David Luban, Epistemology and Moral
Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636, 645 (1983) [hereinafter Luban, Epistemology] (reviewing the "intemalism"
claim that "the mere knowledge of what is moral carries with it the motivation to be moral").
5. I also accept this assumption, see supra note 4, but the peculiar role obligations of lawyers leaves it subject
to some doubt. It is not uncommon to encounter serious critical observation of the lawyering world that
questions whether modem practice includes a commitment to ethical integrity. See, e.g., David Luban &
Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Teaching Ethics in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 31, 57 (1995)
(criticizing the Model Rules for a diminished role for moral suasion to accompany the Rules' legalistic
framework, and observing that with greater discretion unconstrained by such suasion, lawyers will act in
role-directed ways to maximize client interests at the expense of moral behavior); Tanina Rostain, The Company
We Keep: Kronman's The Lost Lawyer and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Practice of Law, 21
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1017, 1035 (1996) (reporting that "[t]he sociological findings suggest that current trends
toward increased practice specialization will severely hamper the development of [the] affective qualities
[necessary for moral practice]. A radical reorganization of the legal profession may be required if deliberative
ideals are to be realized on any meaningful scale."); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (lamenting the alleged lost sense of statesmanship among lawyers); MARY
ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
These grim reports notwithstanding, I argue that my assumption is a fair one. The critics and doubters are
unquestionably correct in their observations about contemporary law practice, but those observations cannot
refute the claim that lawyers care about ethical practice, notwithstanding the increased pressures within the
profession away from that ideal. Studies documenting the dissatisfaction of lawyers whose professional lives
include such pressures support the understanding that .many lawyers would prefer to act in ways which are not
so conflicted. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, What We Talk About When We Talk About Professionalism: A Review of
Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession [Robert L. Nelson et al.
eds., 1992], 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 987, 1005 (1994); KRONMAN, supra, at 2. The experience of clinical
teachers, of which I am one, persistently confirms the proposition that law students care deeply about ethical
propriety. See.Luban & Millemann, supra, at 65-69; Joan O'Sullivan et al., Ethical Decisionmaking and Ethics
Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 109 (1996); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal
Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577,592 (1987) [hereinafter Spiegel, Theory and
Practice].
6. Many observers of the legal profession have criticized its wont to conflate ethics with rules. See, e.g.,
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 963 (1987); Luban, Epistemology,
supra note 4; William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEG. EDUC. 65, 65-66 (1991); Reed
Elizabeth Loder, ighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 311
(1987) [hereinafter Loder, Tighter Rules]; Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 1219 (1990). But see Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal
Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1995) (arguing for more comprehensive coverage of moral complexity within
rules).
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or standard, or similar criterion to differentiate "better" decisions from "worse"
ones. Without some identifiable method by which to evaluate ethical choice,
"caring" about ethics is meaningless. Unless we defend the proposition that any
choice is acceptable so long as it violates no outstanding rule (a proposition with
few defenders), we implicitly accept the reality of normative standards. This, of
course, comes as no surprise, but the nature and source of those standards remain
remarkably elusive, especially in the discourse of legal ethics. This Article
represents an effort to identify sources of moral agreement without descending
into the meta-discussions of the philosophers.
The most conventional approach to questions about moral authority is to
suggest some version of moral theory as the underpinning of ethical choice.
7
Those suggestions intimate a deductive reasoning process. Moral theory serves as
the major premise in a syllogism; the facts of any given case might then be
"applied" to arrive at a conclusion.8 This theory conception not only introduces
many misgivings, including its frequent inaccessibility and the problem of
competing theories, but it also misunderstands our practices. We may not be
entirely sure about the process we use to resolve moral dilemmas, but deducing
answers from a coherent theory is unlikely to be high on the list for most of us. A
more refined, and more recent, approach suggests instead that moral choices
emerge not from syllogistic, end-based reasoning but instead from the right kind
of character and virtue.9 This "virtue ethics" model eschews a focus on quandaries in
favor of identifying effective qualities of personhood. Its difficulties, though, are also
many. Lawyers tend to respect competing virtues, like the rival theories above, and
have scanty standards by which to decide among them. Virtue also possesses
what best might be called a "slipperiness" when applied to discrete dilemmas.
In the pages below, this Article argues that these dominant approaches fail to
inform practicing lawyers - plain persons usually lacking philosophical training
- about how best to resolve their tensions. This Article introduces here and seeks
to defend an alternative insight about ethical choice, one grounded in the wisdom
7. See, e.g., MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHics 3-26 (4th ed. 1997) (including
readings on utilitarianism, the golden rule, and Kantianism in order to "equip [law students] with some tools"
when encountering discretionary ethics).
8. Judith Wagner DeCew and Ian Shapiro describe "the traditional approach [within moral philosophy] to
the role of ethical theory" as follows:
On this view, the major goal of a moral theory is to resolve conflicts arising in moral decision making
to give clear guidance on how to act. The task of theorists is to systematize moral thought and
ultimately provide a principle or set of principles for overcoming or settling what at first appear to be
moral dilemmas.
Judith Wagner DeCew & Ian Shapiro, Introduction, in NoMos XXXVII, THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (Ian Shapiro
& Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995).
9. See, e.g., James F. Keenan, Virtue Ethics: Making a Case as It Comes ofAge, 67 THOUGHT 115, 115 (1992)
("Since 1973, . .. virtue ethics has gained a wider audience and greater critical reception."); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); JEFFREY STOUT, ETmCS AFTER BABEL 266-72 (1988) (exploring
Alasdair MacIntyre's influence on moral philosophy and applied ethics through his emphasis on virtues).
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of the Jesuits of the Middle Ages, the clinical experiences of modem bioethicists,
and the practical judgments of plain persons. This alternative is casuistry.1t
Casuistry accepts the central truths of such grand theories as consequentialism
and Kantianism. It acknowledges the importance of virtue and character, with
special emphasis on practical wisdom and judgment. It melds these insights,
though, with a recognition of the importance of cases and context in moral
thinking, in a process that offers better concrete guidance to those who must
"practice philosophy.""
Casuistry represents a case-based, particularized, context-driven method of
normative decisionmaking.1t Casuistry starts with paradigm cases, examples
upon which most observers will readily agree, and reasons analogicallly from
those agreed-upon cases to more complex cases representing ethical conflict. By
understanding and emphasizing sources of agreement, casuistry elides the all-too-
common stalemate in ethics talk, where "the only alternatives [are] dogmatism
and relativism." 13 The lawyer as casuist need not decide, nor know, whether she
is a Kantian, a utilitarian, or a Rawlsian. Indeed, in one case a lawyer might act
"deontologically," and in a different circumstance act "consequentially," and be
right in both instances. Casuistry leaves the deep and difficult philosophy debates
to the philosophers, and aims its insights to the clinician, the practitioner, and the
plain person. In its rejection of positivism and categorical thinking, and its
emphasis on context, particularity, and phronesis, casuistry claims as intellectual
forebears such influences as ancient rhetoric, Aristotelian ethics, American
pragmatism, and some important strains of postmodernism.
The "new casuistry" has achieved a notable prominence over the last decade
in moral philosophy and especially in bioethics.14 Except perhaps as a pejorative
10. The art described here is known by several labels, although "casuistry" is by far the most common.
Alternative descriptions include "contextualism," Earl L. 'Winkler, From Kantianism to Contextualism: The
Rise and Fall of the Paradigm Theory in Bioethics, in APPLIED ETHICS: A READER 344 (Earl L. Winkler & Jerrold
R. Coomb eds., 1993); "clinical ethics," ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH To
ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (3d ed. 1992); CLINICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 195 (B.
Hoffmaster et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE]; "case-based ethics," John Arras, Principles
and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J. 983 (1994) [hereinafter Aras, Principles and
Particularity]; "inductivism," TOM L. BEAUCHAM & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETnHcs 17 (4th ed.
1994) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP & Cm.uDREss, PPINuPLES IV]; the "determination model," GLENN C. GRABER & DAvID
C. THOMASMA, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL ETHICS 97 (1989); and the "origination model," id. at 125.
11. I borrow this very apt phrase from a recent book by Richard Shusterman, who argues that philosophers
ought to live their lives in aesthetic ways that might exemplify their philosophical ideals. RICHARD SHUSTER-
MAN, PRACTICING PHILOSOPHY: PRAGMATISM AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE (1997).
12. For the most comprehensive exploration of the revival of casuistry as an ethical model, see ALBERT
JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
13. MARK G. KUCZEWSKi, FRAGMENTATION AND CONSENSUS: COMMUNITARIAN AND CASUIST BIOETHICS 81
(1997); see also Ronald H. Mckinney, The New Casuistry versus Narrative Ethics: A Postmodern Analysis, 39
PHIL. TODAY 331,332 (1995) ("[Clasuistry ... avoids both relativism and absolutism.").
14. For a discussion of this "new casuistry," see, e.g., BEDAU, supra note 2, at 105; KuCzEwSKi, supra note
13, at 60-62; Stanley Hauerwas, Reconciling The Practice of Reason: Casuistry in a Christian Context, in
[Vol. 12:489
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synonym for "sophistry," 15 though, it has yet to appear within legal ethics. This
Article is one beginning effort to revive casuistry for lawyers.
The Article develops its defense of casuistry in the following way. Part II
begins with a "discretionary ethics" story, intended to introduce the dominant
paradigms of ethical reasoning, the deductive and the virtue-based models. That
Part argues that theories, principles, and virtue ethics, despite their elegance, are
unsatisfactory when used by those in the untidy world of practice. Part I
develops the idea of casuistry, its justification as a source of moral meaning, and
its component understandings. In Part IV this Article endeavors to show how
casuistry works, with examples of a casuist approach compared to the dominant
paradigms. Using case examples borrowed from an important recent work
defending "communicative ethics," 16 I show that casuistry tends to be more
coherent, more practicable, and more reliable than alternative reasoning methods.
MORAL THEORY AND MORAL JUDGMENTS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 135 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1988) [hereinafter
MORAL THEORY AND MORAL JUDGMENTS]; Mckinney, supra note 13, at 33 1.
15. In 1945 the then-prominent philosopher Edgar Sheffield Brightman wrote the following entry for "casuistry":
1) The application of ethical principles to specific cases. 2) Quibbling, rationalization, sophistry or an
attempt to justify what does not merit justification; this meaning is often associated with methods used
by Jesuits. See equivocation.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 93 (quoting EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN, AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION (1945)). The second of Brightman's definitions persists today, as reference to law
review articles easily shows. See Margaret K. Krasik, The Lights Of Science And Experience: Historical
Perspectives on Legal Attitudes Toward the Role of Medical Expertise in Guardianship of the Elderly, 33 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 201, 228 (1989) (referring critically to "legal casuistry and sophistry"); Shari O'Brien,
Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127, 146 (1986) ("sophistry...
[and] the ingenius casuistry"); W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules,
and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 813 n. 151 (1985)
(remarking that traditional opponents Geoffrey Hazard and Monroe Freedman are "for once united," as Hazard
refers to a perjury evasion device as "casuistry" while Freedman terms it "sophistry").
Albert Jonsen reports that casuistry is also sometimes known, again pejoratively, as "Jesuitry," developing as
it has from the work of the Jesuits of the Middle Ages. Albert R. Jonsen, Casuistry: An Alternative or
Complement to Principles?, 5 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 237, 240 (1995) [hereinafter Jonsen, Alternative or
Complement]. Jonsen, interestingly, was trained as a Jesuit. See Albert Jonsen, On Being A Casuist, in CLINICAL
MEDICAL ETHICS 117, 118 (Terrence F. Ackerman et al. eds., 1987).
One of the few sources that includes a more respectful casuist approach in assessing legal ethics is Robert W.
Tuttle, The Fiduciary's Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889; see also
Robert W. Tuttle, Death's Casuistry, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 371 (1998). There is actually a natural affinity between
casuistry and the law. Casuists repeatedly compare its process of reliance on paradigm cases as precedent for
new disputes, and proceeding through the use of analogical reasoning, with common law jurisprudence. See,
e.g., JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 297-98; Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note 10, at 1001.
The justification of the common law's reliance on analogical reasoning, as well as the accuracy of that claim, is
the subject of some recent controversy in jurisprudential scholarship. See infra note 135.
16. See Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33,90-92 (1996) (proposing a
"discursive method" of ethics based upon postmoder conceptions of community dialogue). While Kupfer's
analysis of moral reasoning through postmodern and communitarian thought offers many insights, it does not
appear to suggest a category separate from the alternatives I discuss in this Article. The discursive method
encourages dialogue as a method of discerning appropriate moral conduct, but within that dialogic encounter, it
seems, the discourse must rely on some conceptions of normative value. In other words, there must be
something to talk about in the discursive method. That "something" must be either some form of moral theory
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II. DOMINANT PARADIGMS OF MORAL REASONING: THEORIES,
PRINCIPLES, AND VIRTUES
A. A TALE OF DISCRETIONARY ETHICS
The reasoning and insight underlying casuistry have relevance for law practice
or legal ethics broadly defined, 17 but the scope of the argument here is a more
limited one. This part explores the implications of casuistry for "discretionary
ethics"' 8 - that part of the ethics of law practice in which the regulatory
or principles, or virtues, or a type of case-based, bottom-up reasoning from paradigmatic cases. Kupfer's
discussion, in fact, implies all three at different points. See, e.g., id., at 59 ("[S]tudent attorneys ... need a
theory with which to confront and give meaning to their practices.... We need to teach our students how to
reason using moral premises."); id. at 44-45 (approving of Dean Kronman's suggestion of the importance of
good character and virtue, along with the acquisition of judgment, to effective moral practice); id. at 36-37
(stressing postmodemism's focus on "particularity and context," and a rejection that "there are normative
general principles that should govern professional conduct").
17. One could make arguments for the role of casuistry in understanding and critiquing how judges make
decisions or how lawyers make strategic choices, or to question the role of rules versus discretionary norms as
the most effective model of legal ethics "regulation." Such arguments, in fact, have been made, if perhaps not
always under the rubric of casuistry. For instance, the topic of judges' discretion in decisionmaking, and the
preferences for discretionary judgment versus rules-bound activity, has been a live one at least since the days of
the legal realists. See, e.g., Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in 20th Century America:
Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986) (surveying jurisprudential debate from
Holmes through Fuller); CAss R. SUNsTEiN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLmCAL CONFLICr (1996) (defending a
casuistic vision of how judges perform their duties); Posner, supra note 4. Similarly, whether legal ethics ought
to be the subject of stricter and more comprehensive rules, or instead dedicated to development of moral
character and individual responsibility, has received thoughtful and extended attention. See, e.g., Loder, Tighter
Rules, supra note 6, at 323; Luban, Epistemology, supra note 4; Fred Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 223
(1993).
18. Discretionary ethics can best be understood through the following scheme. Consider a lawyer faced with
an instance of moral conflict, in which she must decide between proceeding with course of action "x," on the
one hand, or an alternative course of action "y," on the other. Her dilemma may or may not be subject to the
body of professional regulation. This lawyer's experience will inevitably fit into one of the following five
categories:
I. The moral implications strongly favor x and the (professional) legal obligations demand x.
2. The moral implications are deeply in conflict, and the (professional) legal obligations demand x.
3. The moral implications strongly favor x, but the (professional) legal obligations demand y.
4. The moral obligations strongly favor x, and the (professional) legal obligations permit the
lawyer discretion to act in any fashion.
5. The moral obligations are deeply in conflict, and the (professional) legal obligations permit
the lawyer discretion to act in any fashion.
This scheme not only shows the relationship among the three parts of legal ethics I have just described, but
highlights the particular importance of discretionary ethics. In two of these instances, the lawyer acts without
any discernible difficulty. Scenario I and scenario 4 present virtually no reason for a lawyer to pause and wrestle
with moral conflict. The lawyer simply acts in consonance with her moral commitments, either because she
"must" (1), or because she "may" (4). Scenario 2 presents greater tension, but not as great as 3 or 5. The second
type of conflict assumes some serious worry by a lawyer about what she ought to do, but there are strong
arguments from competing sides, and her lawful obligation demands that she favor one over the other. If those
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schemes now in place have conferred full discretion on lawyers to act in the best
way they can.
This part begins with an example. A young lawyer, Mark, works in a legal
services office in a very poor community. Mark represents Edna, who came to
Mark's office with a notice from the Department of Public Welfare (DPW)
terminating the TANF' 9 welfare benefits on which she relies to support her three
children. According to the DPW notice, Edna did not provide adequate documen-
tation or "verifications" necessary to maintain benefits for another year. Mark's
research shows that, while the welfare administrators were correct in their
determination, the verifications are easily acquired, and the regulations permit
Edna to submit these verifications at an appeal hearing, with no penalty.20 These
are among the "easy" cases in a poverty law practice.
Edna's case has a complication, however. Mark's interview of Edna discloses
that her uncle routinely gives her money for food and clothes for her children.
That money is regular and, by Mark's reading of the state welfare regulations,
reportable and "countable.", 21 Edna also baby-sits on a predictable schedule but
has never informed the welfare office about that money, which is also reportable
and countable by Mark's reading of applicable law. The reporting and counting of
obligations are indeed relatively evenly weighted (otherwise she slips to a Category 3 conflict), she presumably
will obey her legal obligation with a minimum of regret.
Contrast that process with situations 3 and 5. Category 3 is what I understand to represent the "moral
activism" quandary. The difficulty in acting in these instances is pronounced, as the competing obligations are
each weighted heavily (the duty to obey the law and one's role obligations, versus the duty to act in a morally
upstanding fashion), but one of those obligations is the law. To elect the other one is to engage in a form of civil
disobedience, and at times doing so is the morally compelling choice.
Category 5 represents discretionary ethics. It includes all of those choices which display moral entanglement
but in which the lawyer is left to her own good judgment about how to act. Instances of discretionary ethics are
quite common, and tend to produce considerable angst in lawyers. Law teachers in practice observe that angst
regularly, and the observation is not surprising, since, unlike in much of their work lives, lawyers must accept
full responsibility for their actions in discretionary ethics affairs. Note also that while conceptually (and
"legally") a distinction must be drawn between discretionary ethics and moral activism, in fact the latter is a
subset of the former for my purposes. In both instances, a lawyer must look not to prevailing professional
standards to decide how to act, but instead to other sources of moral guidance. It matters little, at bottom,
whether that moral fount is used for the hard discretionary ethics choices or the hard moral activism, a/k/a civil
disobedience, choices.
19. TANF is an acronym for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the federal welfare program that
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). See Title I of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Responsibility Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617. TANF is a far more restrictive scheme of aid for needy
families than was the not-overly-generous AFDC. Indeed, the Act abolishes the former entitlement under
AFDC: "This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State
program funded under this part." Id. See Sylvia Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REv. 471,488
(1997); Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor. Welfare Reform All Over Again and the Undermining of
Democratic Citizenship, 7 HAST. WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1996).
20. In Massachusetts, for instance, a welfare recipient whose benefits were subject to termination because
she did not provide adequate verification of some fact may maintain her benefits if she provides the required
documentation at her appeal hearing. 106 CODE OF MASSACHUSETITS REGULATIONS § 343.55(A) (1997).
21. See 106 CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS REGULATIONS § 204.200 (1997).
1999]
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these two sources of income would leave Edna eligible for a very small amount of
welfare benefits. She would not be barred from participation in the program, but
the level of her benefits would be affected significantly if she were to report the
income.22
Mark is in a dilemma. He has a lawful, non-frivolous, and indeed quite
promising defense to DPW's effort to terminate Edna's welfare benefits. In doing
so, though, he participates, arguably, in a form of "welfare fraud," for Mark's
success at the hearing will advance Edna's unlawful procurement of TANF funds.
While Mark's research shows that no substantive law forbids him from working
on this hearing,23 his representation of Edna raises moral concerns that need to be
justified.
If an ethicist were to buttonhole Mark before his hearing and ask him to
explain or justify his choices here, the ethicist might encounter something like the
following:
I know this is a tough call. Edna will received a lot of money that she does not
"deserve" in a substantive sense, and I play a part in that result. But there are
legal arguments on her behalf supporting her continued eligibility, so it's not
illegal for me to do what Edna asks. But not everything that's legal is moral, I
understand.
So how do I justify this on a moral level? I worry a lot about that. On the one
hand, there's my commitment to Edna as my client, and my agreement to be her
advocate. I confess I am also swayed by her need for the money. Edna finds it
very hard, literally impossible perhaps, to survive on what the welfare officials
offer her for a monthly grant. The money comes from this large government
agency which has never been too friendly to our clients, and they'll never miss
this few thousand dollars per year given their multi-million dollar budgets.
There are political arguments persuading me that welfare grants are never set at
subsistence levels, so it's not as though Edna is being greedy or anything.
On the other hand, I am taking advantage of an agency and a hearing officer
who will decide this case without knowing the true implication of his or her
22. I deliberately have chosen to leave Edna with a trivial level of TANF benefits rather than to define her
predicament in a way that rendered her flatly ineligible for benefits. I do so in order to approximate what I
perceive as a "discretionary ethics" plight for the lawyer, instead of one involving "moral activism." If Edna is,
by any neutral interpretation of the law, not entitled to participate in the welfare scheme, it more closely
resembles lawlessness for her lawyer to argue technical issues that maintain her on the program. This excess of
lawyer role is what I understand to be the essence of moral activism. If, on the other hand, the best neutral
interpretation of the law confirms her eligibility, her lawyer's arguments directed toward maintaining her on the
program, while eliding the question of the appropriate amount of assistance she will receive, is hardly
"lawless." Because it still raises some moral issues but not legal ones, the example qualifies as a discretionary
ethics matter.
23. I have crafted this example to avoid Mark's active participation in client fraud, which of course would be
plainly forbidden by the codes governing lawyer conduct, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] as well as by what Geoffrey Hazard terms the "other
law" within the "law of lawyering." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6
GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 701 (1993). If my assumptions here are correct, Mark will suffer no formal professional
sanction for his work on this hearing.
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decision. Edna has no right to this money, and it is only my careful lawyering
that keeps the money in her pocket. I hate it when big firm lawyers use those
tactics to take advantage of the IRS, or bankruptcy debtors, or consumers. I am
sure that they all think that their particular case justifies their sharp tactics, just
as I'm trying to do here.
In the end, I will make the arguments for Edna because she is my client and
because she is poor. I would not violate the law for those reasons, but, again,
everything I do in this case is legal, and that makes it harder for me to opt for a
path that my client doesn't want. The fact that it is my role to make the best
legal arguments for Edna also persuades me a great deal. This is, after all, what
lawyers are hired to do.
Mark seems to be reasonably thoughtful here, and considerate of the appropri-
ate moral implications. His sentiments probably exemplify how lawyers tend to
think about discretionary ethics matters. At the same time, his deliberation is ad
hoc - it lacks reference to evaluative standards or benchmarks by which to judge
the success of the endeavor, other than its ultimate reliance on the role obliga-
tions, which, as the ethicist would teach us, cannot serve as an operative trump in
this kind of moral reasoning.24
The pertinent question, of course, is whether some method or process might
serve Mark better in his struggle through discretionary ethics. 25 That inquiry
ought to have meaning for most practitioners, even if its goals seem rather
elusive. Either one believes that there are coherent ways to understand moral
disagreement, or one does not. For the latter individuals, there is no such method
of practical ethics that can ever "work," and we can safely ignore them. The rest
of us, while not denying that moral reality is controversial and that objective
answers about moral reality are, at the very least, debatable, nevertheless accept
that some basis exists by which to discuss questions of value.
These considerations invite a search for a process of ethical reasoning with the
following characteristics:
1) The process must be coherent, so that its users can, logically and
analytically, compare its application and evaluate its usefulness.
2) The process must be accessible to plain people who have not studied
moral philosophy.
26
3) Related to this last point, the process cannot, as a condition for its
24. For the most comprehensive argument against viewing role obligations as trumping ordinary moral
sentiments, see DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUsTIcE: AN ETHIcAL STUDY 104-47 (1988).
25. For a discussion of the value of some structure to ethical deliberation, see Camille A. Gear, Note, The
Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Literature, 107 YALE L.J. 2473, 2476
(1998) (desciibing clinical experience in which the author "longed for an ethics paradigm" that would assist her
to accomplish her ethical goals).
26. So much of what is written in this area fails this test rather dramatically. Abstract language and abstruse
concepts are common complaints Within professional discussion of moral philosophy. See, e.g., Martha
Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1627, 1641-42
(1993) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Use andAbuse of Philosophy].
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usefulness, require that its users resolve the metaethical questions about
the source of moral value; but at the same time,
4) any given process must assume some coherent account of the source of
moral value.
5) Finally, the deliberative method should work to "unmask[] the intellec-
tual pretensions of those who would use or misuse philosophical doctrines
in support of venality and self-deception.", 27 In other words, the method
ought to be useful in distinguishing what is sometimes known as "soph-istry',28 from valid moral discourse.
Much of the work of the work of 20th century ethicists, and in particular that
within modem bioethics, proceeds with these requirements in mind. The impor-
tant consideration is whether their work can have any meaningful influence on
the practice lives of ordinary lawyers.
B. DEDUCTIVE AND ANALYTIC MODELS: THEORY AND PRINCIPLISM
1. Moral Theory
Mark's search for a more grounded response to his ethical dilemma would
probably lead him to moral theory. Legal ethics texts frequently suggest that
moral theory can aid in the resolution of moral choices, 29 a suggestion which
makes sense, as "moral theory" implies a systematic understanding of the
philosophy of value.30 For the most part, Mark would find that direction
unhelpful. Let us explore why.
27. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Kant on Theory and Practice, in NoMos XXXVII, THEORY AND PRACTICE 47, 48 (Ian
Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995). Murphy cites Immanuel Kant's concern for "moral philistines,"
and those who would use "philosophical doctrines ... to give cover of intellectual respectability to the
iniquities and deceptions practiced by such persons." "There is very little that a philosopher can do directly to
combat ordinary human venality and self-deception," but at least the philosophers can work to limit the excuses
and covers for those who act that way. Id.
28. Webster's New World Dictionary defines "sophistry" as "misleading but clever reasoning." It shares the
pejorative reputation that casuistry once had, although the negative connotation of sophistry remains much
more insistent. The word comes to us from the work of the Sophists, a term that once meant "experts," who
were Greek philosophers who held that all morality was personal. Trained in the art of rhetoric, the Sophists
came to be known as those who would use careful argument for whoever would pay their fee - a notable
resemblance to what we now know as lawyers. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 17-19 (Anthony
Kenny ed., 1994).
If sophistry is to be condemned, though, it ought not be so for its use of rhetoric as a central theme of its
teaching. The use of rhetoric is an important element of the work of the casuists as well, as we see below. See
infra notes 212-229 and accompanying text. It is not rhetoric, with its important connection to practical
judgment, that damns sophistry, but instead it would be sophistry's lack of a moral core. See, e.g., BEDAU, supra
note 2, at 101.
29. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 70-76 (1986); THOMAS M. MORGAN & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1995); DEBORAH L. RHODE &
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHIcs 7-10 (2d ed. 1992).
30. See Spiegel, Theory and Practice, supra note 5, at 580 ("[B]y 'theory' we commonly mean a set of
general propositions used as an explanation. Theory has to be sufficiently abstract to be relevant to more than
just particularized situations.").
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Critics have begun to address the weaknesses in moral theory by focusing on
its deductive quality.3I The conventional expectation for theory, when unpacked,
is deductive in nature. Theory produces the major premise within a syllogism; the
facts of a given case serve as the minor premise; and the syllogism effects the
answer.32 This syllogism thesis for moral theory is incorrect, and cannot serve as
a formula to guide Mark's decisionmaking, for two distinct reasons.
The first, and weaker, reason is Mark's inability, as a plain person, to decide
upon a discrete theory to guide his actions. Moral philosophy is crowded with
competing theories of the right and the good. The discipline is broadly divided
between deontologists and consequentialists, but even that categorization masks
many more nuanced disputes among moral philosophers.33 Presumably each
theory will provide differing advice to Mark; if that is so, his choice of theory will
play a significant role in how he chooses to act.34 But making such a choice
among the array of potential theories would be a considerable challenge for
Mark, as it would be for most lawyers. The theorist position implies that
practitioners must elect such a theory, certainly a counterfactual implication
which, even if true, would predict blind or random choices at best.35
31. See, e.g., DeCew & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 2-3; Henry S. Richardson, Specifying Norms as a Way to
Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 279, 281 (1990) [hereinafter Richardson,
Specifying Norms].
32. Henry Richardson calls this reasoning a "Peripatetic syllogism." See Richardson, Specifying Norms,
supra note 31, at 281. Bioethicists Graber and Thomasma offer this example of the deductive syllogistic
process:
Normative premise: One ought to treat each person as an end-in-himself or herself and never
merely as a person.
Description of situation: To use a person as a subject in nontherapeutic research when he or she has
not given free and informed consent to participate is to treat him or her
merely as a means.
Conclusion: One ought never to use such a person as a subject nontherapeutic research
unless he or she has given free and informed consent to participate.
GRABER & THOMASMA, supra note 10, at 22. Graber and Thomasma employ a Kantian position as the original
premise in this effort to demonstrate what they term a "moral principle... syllogism." Id.
33. For a discussion of competing philosopher ideologies, see, e.g., WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 14-22
(2d ed. 1973); GRABER & THOMASMA, supra note 10, at 215-16; Stanley G. Clarke & Evan Simpson,
Introduction: The Primacy of Moral Practice, in ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS AND MORAL CONSERVATISM 1, 4
(Stanley G. Clarke & Evan Simpson eds., 1989).
34. It is an odd assertion that whether an act is moral or not can depend upon one's philosophical orientation.
The casuists disagree with that sentiment, but many theorists assume its validity. Students are frequently taught
that differing moral theories will lead to different "right" answers to ethical questions. Consider the following
example from a medical school ethics test:
Different moral perspectives can give rise to different judgments about actions. Describe a medical
situation in which different decisions might be made by a Kantian (or Rawlsian) on the one hand and a
utilitarian on the other. Explain what the difference would be and how it would arise.
S. GOROWITZ ET AL., MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 543 (1976) quoted in Philip E. Devine, Theory and Practice
in Ethics, in MORAL THEORY AND MORAL JUDGMENTS, supra note 14, at 213, 213.
35. The problem of expert disagreement about moral theory has been noted by others. See, e.g., David
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A brief example should make this point. Mark's philosophical research might
lead him to the prominent philosopher Alan Donagan; indeed, Donagan's book
The Theory ofMorality3 6 seems by its title to fit Mark's needs perfectly. Donagan
is a deontologist philosopher who maintains that theory can effect concrete action.
His work "show[s] how moralists working in the Kantian tradition go from their
general moral principles to judgments in individual cases.", 37 Mark's reading of
Donagan's Kantian analysis, which would be difficult, should lead him to conclude that
the individual circumstances and needs of Edna's life cannot affect Mark's duties as a
lawyer, which arise from universal and categorical considerations.3 s Mark might
then conclude that a universalized and categorical approach to this dilemma
would bar him from assisting Edna at her TANF hearing.
In this way Mark will have used moral philosophy to resolve his conflict. But
the difficulties with that conclusion are manifest. Not only should Mark wonder
whether his reading of Donagan is faithful to the author's Kantian theory,39 but,
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 498 (1990) ("[If the philosophers have no
consensus, how can we expect lawyers to rely on them?"); Raanan Gillon, The Four Principles Revisited: A
Reappraisal, FOUR PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETucs 319, 326 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994) [hereinafter Gillon,
A Reappraisal] ("If life-long philosophers cannot succeed at this enterprise to the satisfaction of their
philosophical opponents it would surely be ludicrous even to suggest that it is appropriate for health care
workers ... to attempt it."). For a similar observation about jurisprudence, see Steven Lubet, Is Legal Theory
Good for Anything?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 193, 206 (1997) ("[I]f law professors, including some with
doctorates, are unable to produce adequate theoretical writing, what hope is there for mere practitioners?").
36. ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALIrY (1977). Critics have noted Donagan's choice of title in his
article, suggesting not one theory among many but rather "the" theory of morality. See e.g., Stout, supra note 9,
at 125.
37. Alan Donagan, The Relation of Moral Theory to Moral Judgments: A Kantian View, in MORAL THEORY
AND MORAL JUDGMENTS, supra note 14, at 171.
38. As a Kantian, Donagan holds to "a deontology: a system of absolute or categorical requirements on our
conduct imposed by practical reason." Id. Practical reason concludes that the essence of moral action rests with
respect for persons as ends, and not means. From that universal principle, and not by intuitions, one judges the
correctness of one's actions. Donagan describes (using Kant's language) the "universal law of Recht," which
"amounts to this: that when you are in a situation in which you and others cannot all accomplish purposes in
themselves unobjectionable, you are to agree on a rule that will not reduce any of you to mere means to the good
of others." Id. at 177, relying on IMMANuEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG DER METAPHYSIK DER SnrrEN (2d ed. 1786).
Since "individuals will differ about who is entitled to what[,] ... [w]hat is needed is an accepted public
authority to define Recht ... and, when it is established, [one] must obey its laws, even though they will almost
certainly be defective." Donagan, supra note 37, at 178. Donagan supplies an example of Recht as applied:
A driver of a vehicle bringing medical supplies to a scene of an accident may not break whatever
universal law may be in force forbidding dangerous driving, even though every minute gained will
save lives, and few will be hurt by breaking the law.... The uses of the streets declared wrong are
wrong, no matter what good to others may result.
Id.
39. It is not entirely self-evident that the categorical principle Donagan espouses leads to the conclusion
suggested above, that Mark eschew any assistance to Edna because of its affiliation with welfare fraud. Another
plausible application of the law of Recht would conclude that, since Mark's appearance is not unlawful (it was,
recall, an exemplar of discretionary ethics), he has no reason to decide for himself that his participation would
be wrong.
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more importantly, he deserves to worry whether Donagan is right. Donagan is a
celebrated philosopher, but other equally distinguished thinkers believe that he is
simply wrong in his approach.40 Donagan is Kantian in his orientation. Perhaps
the utilitarians41 or the pluralists are more persuasive. 42 Mark needs to resolve
that uncertainty, and it is fair to predict that he will not find the time to get that
task done.4 3
Thus far we have assumed that in order to use theory as a guide Mark must
"opt in" ex ante as a deontologist or consequentialist and proceed according to
his chosen dogma. If that kind of full-scale commitment is too much to expect of
any non-philosopher, perhaps Mark can instead apply moral theory selectively,
sometimes using the Kantian theories and at other times the utilitarian." John
Arras characterizes this approach as the "Consumer Reports" model of ethical
reasoning,45 in which the theorists offer up the menu of major premises from
40. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 9, at 129-35 (assessing Donagan's "fundamental principle of respect from
which the entire content of morality ... can be derived," and finding that it "bears virtually no weight");
Michael J. Perry, Some Notes on Absolutism, Consequentialism, and Incommensurability, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
967, 971 (disagreeing with Donagan).
41. See, e.g., R.M. Hare, Can Moral Philosophy Help?, in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE 49 (Stuart F. Spicker & H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. eds. 1977) (defending a rule-utilitarian theory);
Robert P. George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1409 (1988) ("The
fundamental problem with Kantian moral theory, according to neo-scholastics (and others), is that, in refusing to
ground morality in a concern for human well-being, it renders moral rules ultimately pointless.").
42. See, e.g., GRABER & THOMASMA, supra note 10, at 173-202 (defending a "unitary theory of clinical
ethics"); BARUCH A. BRODY, LIFE AND DEATH DECISION MAKING 9-16 (1988) (articulating a "pluralistic
theory").
43. The argument here also ignores the accompanying truth that, notwithstanding the claims of some like
Donagan, most of moral theory offers little in the way of practical advice. David Luban tells the following story:
[A] morally troubled admirer once complained to Kant, "Now put yourself in my place and either
damn me or give me solace. I read the metaphysic of morals and the categorical imperative, and it
doesn't help a bit."
David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice,
49 MD. L. REv. 424,442 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Mid-Course Corrections].
44. In her excellent legal ethics textbook, Deborah Rhode implies such a selective application of theory. See
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsmLrrY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 13 (2d ed. 1998). In a
chapter entitled "Traditions of Moral Reasoning," Rhode canvasses several approaches to moral choice,
highlighting the "two primary branches" of normative theory, the teleological and the deontological. Id. at 14.
She then poses these questions for her readers:
Which of the preceding ethical approaches best captures your view? Under what professional
circumstances would you be most likely to use utilitarian, rights-based, or character-based ap-
proaches. To what extent would you expect different outcomes? Why?
Id. at 25-26.
45. Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note 10, at 989. Arras credits the philosopher Annette Baler as
a source of this insight. See ANNETTE BAIER, Doing Without Moral Theory, in POSTURES OF THE MIND 228, 235
(1985). Baier refers to the use of philosopher experts in such an enterprise as "moral valets, or professional
moral judges," borrowing the phrase from Hegel. Id.
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which the practitioners may select one or more, depending on the circumstances.
Arras imagines the philosophers' teaching as follows:
Well, in this situation a Kantian would do "X," a utilitarian would promote
"Y," and a natural rights theorist would advocate "Z.,,
4 6
While this "menu" conception asks less of the plain person practitioner, it begs
the most critical question - how Mark chooses among the available menu
options. So long as Mark's choice of philosophical theory depends itself on some
theoretical construct, he remains at sea in the absence of more sophisticated
philosophical training. As one philosopher puts it:
[T]he discovery that a Kantian would do this, a Millian that, and a Rawlsian
something else [is] not terribly helpful for those who had to make a decision
without the leisure to sort out where they stood in these debates.4 7
This difficulty leads to the second, and what I call the stronger, criticism of the
moral theory conception. The menu idea fails not simply because of its reliance
on usually-scarce philosophical expertise, but more critically because it has the
moral reasoning process backwards. It is probably true that Mark will at times act
like a deontologist, and at other times will better resemble a utilitarian. That
choice, though, is not theory-driven. The test of a theory is not further theory, but
rather its fit with considered practical judgments.48 Mark evaluates the sugges-
tions arising from theory by reference to their fit with the circumstances he faces.
Apparent disharmony will cause Mark to reject a theory, despite its intellectual or
logical elegance. As Judith Jarvis Thomson writes, "it is precisely our moral
views about examples, stories, and cases which constitute the data for moral
theorizing. ' 49 The strong objection to theory, then, rejects its deductive direction
as a faulty description of moral reality. The casuists exploit this realization in
their appeal for a bottom-up, rather than a top-down, process of moral reasoning,
as we shall see below.
5 0
46. Id. at 989.
47. Winkler, supra note 10, at 350.
48. This insight is frequently attributed to John Rawls and his notion of "considered moral judgments." JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 49 (1971). The insight is also a natural corollary of the modem rejection of the
"fact/value distinction." The traditional theorists' view of ethics separated moral meaning from the world of
facts; as Annette Baier describes it, "there are beautiful souls doing their theoretical thing and averting their
eyes from what is happening in the real world ...." BALER, supra note 45, at 235. Modem and postmodem
philosophers have attacked the distinction, arguing that descriptions of value, "right," or "good," cannot be
understood outside of felt experience and actual circumstances. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward a
Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); KuCZEWSKI, supra note 13, at 10,
100.
49. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISKS 257 (1986).
50. See notes 111-37 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:489
1999] THE NEW CASUISTRY
2. Principlism
The concerns about theory's practice-fitness have led moral philosophers to
suggest an alternative method grounded in more workable and focused value-
statements. In reaction to the unfriendliness of the theoretical debates, some
ethicists propose "principles" as a substitute for theory. Principles represent
more discrete and accessible statements of value that transcend differences
among theories. Effective principles, under this conception, would be justified by
any coherent theory, freeing practitioners like Mark from the deep debates among
the philosophers. This approach has come to be known as "principlism.
' 5 1
Principlism gained prominence in the 1970s with the publication of Beauchamp
and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 52 perhaps the most important
applied ethics text within medicine. The principlists believed that broad consen-
sus might be attained about mid-level principles, regardless of philosophical
orientation.53 Thus, in medicine Beauchamp and Childress identify four central
principles - autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.54 The claim is
that these clusters represent a form of "common morality," 55 and tap into an
"overlapping consensus' 56 among the otherwise distinctly different moral theories.
51. The term "principlism" seems to have been coined by two critics of the use of principles as a method of
moral reasoning, K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert. See K. Danner Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of
Principlism, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 219 (1990). The term is not used only by critics of this approach. The authors to
whom the criticisms are most commonly directed, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, employ it as well. See,
e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 37 (noting that the term has been used
"somewhat disparagingly"); Tom L. Beauchamp, Principlism and its Alleged Competitors, 5 KENNEDY INST. OF
ETHics J. 181 (1995)[hereinafter Alleged Competitors].
52. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1 St ed. 1977) [hereinafter
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES I]. Beauchamp and Childress have updated their book three times since
the 1977 edition, and in doing so the formulation of the "principlist" method has evolved considerably. As we
see below, the fourth edition has incorporated much from the casuistic critiques. See id. (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES II]; id. (3rd ed. 1989) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES III]; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10.
53. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 100-01. For instance, one of the authors of
Principles of Biomedical Ethics is a utilitarian and the other a deontologist, but each agrees fully with the
articulated principles. Id. at 110. Ezekial Emanuel calls this claim a "central tenet of principlism." Ezekial J.
Emanuel, The Beginning of the End of Principlism, 25 HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 37, 38 (July-Aug. 1995).
54. Id. at passim. Despite considerable refinements in their earlier reliance on a pure deductivist model,
Beauchamp and Childress maintain in their most recent work a firm reliance on these four principles.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 38.
55. Emanuel, supra note 53, at 38. For a similar argument about "common morality" made by a philosopher
working within law, see LUBAN, supra note 24. The propriety of that claim - that something resembling a
"common morality" is sufficiently recognizable to consider it a palpable concept for lawyers - has been the
subject of some debate since Luban published that book. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a
Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) [hereinafter Ellmann, Lawyeringfor Justice]; David Luban,
Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Attorney-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1004 (1990); see also Reed Elizabeth Loder, Out of Uncertainty: A Model of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, I S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 89, 134 (1993) [hereinafter Loder, Out of Uncertainty] (questioning the
reliability of the concept).
56. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 102.
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Principlism "became the dominant paradigm for serious work in bioethics," 5 7
and for good reason, at least initially. The notion of principles, while not offering
the "ultimate ethical algorithm,", 58 permits conversation through common lan-
guage and agreement about normative terms. The ethicists' in-depth treatment of
each of the principles allows practitioners to understand, for instance, when it
was appropriate to act paternalistically, or when a provider might be obligated to
assist another in need.
One can readily see the relevance of principles for lawyers. There is a distinct
strain of principlism within contemporary legal ethics scholarship, expressing (if
more ambiguously, perhaps) principles not so different from those central to
bioethics. Both law and medicine, for instance, share a central commitment to
autonomy59 and justice .60 The legal profession might not encounter the bioethi-
cists' concerns for nonmaleficence and beneficence, at least centrally, but lawyers
instead would identify confidentiality, 6 1 loyalty,62 and perhaps zeal 63 as compa-
rable principles.
This is not the forum for a full exploration of the viability of principlism as a
model of ethical reasoning either in medicine or law. We can note, though, that
principlism fails to overcome the strong objection to the theory identified
57. Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note 10, at 986.
58. Applied ethics texts often allude to the quest for the ultimate ethical algorithm. See, e.g., JONSEN &
TouLMIN, supra note 12, at 7; Mckinney, supra note 13, at 332; Stephen Toulmin, How Medicine Saved the Life
of Ethics, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ETHICS 265 (Joseph P. DeMarco & Richard M. Fox eds., 1986) [hereinafter
NEW DIRECTIONS].
59. Respect for autonomy is central to client-centered decisionmaking. See, e.g., D. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS
AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1990); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39
UCLA L. REV. 697, 700 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990) [hereinafter Dinerstein, Reappraisal and Refinement].
60. See LUBAN, supra note 24, at 60; ANTHONY D'AMATO & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM (1992); Frank I. Michelman, On Regulating Practices with Theories Drawn From Them: A Case of
Justice as Fairness, in NoMos XXXVII, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 309. Unlike in conventional
ethics circles, practicing lawyers are known to argue that they achieve justice by advocating zealously for each
individual client, rather than for "just" results in any given case. For a description of that posture and a cogent
criticism of it, see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988)
[hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion].
61. For the best defense of the confidentiality precept, see Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer. The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). While recent
efforts have begun the unpacking of this principle, see, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65
U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989), there
nevertheless is little doubt that this commitment is central to lawyering ethics.
62. For a comprehensive, and still quite helpful, inquiry into the duty of loyalty, see Developments in the
Law: Conflicts of Interests in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981). As with confidentiality just
above, the dedication to unfettered client loyalty has been subject to some rethinking in recent years, as courts
and commentators recognize the interests of third parties. See, e.g., Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney
Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823, 824 (1992); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589
(1961) (implying that a lawyer who drafts a will may be liable to beneficiaries for malpractice).
63. The notion of zeal as a foundational principle of legal ethics is both self-evident and increasingly
controversial. In its support, see, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 65-66 (1990).
For trenchant criticism, see, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 24, at 50-148.
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above,64 as critics now regularly acknowledge.65 While its adherents sometimes
claim otherwise, 66 principlism is fundamentally deductive in its approach,67 an
orientation implying that one first identify the relevant principle and then apply it
to the facts at hand, much like the theorists' model suggests. But, like theories,
principles conflict; 68 indeed, it is the very conflict between strongly-held prin-
64. Some criticism of principlism, though, arrives from the opposite direction - from the theorists, who
complain that the weakness of principlism is its lack of a unified, coherent moral theory through which to
resolve the particular conflicts. See Clouser & Gert, supra note 51, at 219 (arguing that principles neither guide
action nor possess a relationship which would avoid the conflict among them arising from the premise that these
principles do not all emanate from a single, unified theory); Ronald M. Green, Method in Bioethics: A Troubled
Assessment, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 179, 189 (1990) (questioning whether normative discussion is possible when
principles conflict without a means of prioritizing the principles) [hereinafter Green, Method in Bioethics].
65. While principlism was aptly characterized as the "central paradigm" of applied ethics, the very titles of
some critics' works capture some of the frustration with this model which has since lost much favor within the
discipline. E.g., A MAI-ER OF PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S. BioEThics (Edwin R. DuBose et al. eds., 1994);
RONALD P. HAMEL ET AL., BEYOND PRINCIPLISM (1993); Emanuel, supra note 53, at 37 (reviewing BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10); Stephen Toulmin, The Tyranny of Principles, 11 HASTINGS. CT. REP.
31 (Dec. 1981) [hereinafter Toulmin, Tyranny of Principles].
66. Beauchamp and Childress deny that their method is deductive in a strict sense, but instead suggest that it
melds deduction, induction, and the analogical reasoning favored by the casuists. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 100-01, 106-08 (discussing "principle-based, common-morality" theories and
replying to criticism); Beauchamp, Alleged Competitors, supra note 51, at 182-83 (offering principles not as a
comprehensive theory, but instead as applicable to biomedical ethics specifically).
67. See, e.g., Karen Hanson, Are Principles Ever Properly Ignored? A Reply to Beauchamp on Bioethical
Paradigms, 69 IND. L.J. 975, 977-78 (1994) (discussing how principlism's reliance on a fact/value schism, with
the application of the norms to the circumstances, leaves it as a fundamentally deductive method); Raymond J.
Devettere, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 137 (1990) (reviewing BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES Im, supra note 52).
In a famous graphic, Beauchamp and Childress outlined their model in a manner which implies deduction:
4. Ethical Theories
T
3. Principles
1
2. Rules
I
1. Particular Judgments and Actions
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES 11, supra note 52, at 5. While the arrows move upward, reflecting
justification, the reasoning process moves downward. "According to this diagram, judgments about what ought
to be done in particular situations are justified by moral rules, which in turn are justified by principles, which
ultimately are justified by ethical theories." Id. Beauchamp and Childress maintain the graphic throughout their
four editions, with slight modification appearing in the fourth edition, omitting the language just quoted in their
most recent edition.
68. The bioethicist John Arras offers a simple example. Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note 10, at
993. A doctor wishes to lie to her patient in order to lift his spirits and facilitate recovery. One could say that this
doctor's act violates the principle of autonomy and the law of informed consent. Indeed, one could deploy
reasoning in this case as a deductive syllogism: "It is wrong to lie to patients. Dr. Jones has told a lie. Therefore,
Dr. Jones has done something wrong." Id. Arras notes the obvious difficulty:
The problem, of course, is that even in a simple, straightforward case, this reasoning has suppressed a
conflicting principle - the principle of beneficence. This is precisely the principle that Dr. Jones
would appeal to should she try to defend her lie.
Id. Arras argues that the example just used is especially interesting because of the trumping characteristic that
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ciples that represents the prototype of ethical tension.69 Principlism only serves
as a guiding "ethics paradigm ' 70 if it can justify a form of ex ante "lexical
ordering" of available principles, but, to no surprise, neither principlism nor
modem moral philosophy generally has defended such a scheme. 7' This has led
one writer to dub the resulting frustration as "[t]he... unbearable [1]ightness of
[plrinciple. '7
2
To be fair, the more recent principlist literature acknowledges this criticism,
instead suggesting versions of the conception grounded in pragmatism 73 and
the principle of autonomy has achieved in recent years within medical culture. Id. That same phenomenon has
been noted in legal culture as well. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.
Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213 (1991) (arguing against the autonomy or "informed consent" view of
lawyer-client relations as indistinct from a paternalistic view); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions of Practice] (doubting whether client
autonomy is as achievable as traditional writers assume); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the
Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88) (conceptualiz-
ing lawsuits as sources of collective, and not individual, benefit). Cf. Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty
Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REv. 123 (1992) (critiquing the Simon and White perspective on autonomy); Mark
Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997
BYU L. REv. 307 (responding to Simon). For a recent articulate defense of the autonomy principle, especially
with poor clients, see Gear, supra note 25.
69. This criticism is the most common one found within the critics' work. See, e.g., Arras, Principles and
Particularity, supra note 10, at 992-99 (critiquing principlism as too mechanistic); Thomas H. Murray, Medical
Ethics, Moral Philosophy and Moral Tradition, 25 Soc. SC. & MED. 637, 638 (1987) (pointing out the
shortcomings of deductivism); Toulmin, Tyranny of Principles, supra note 65 (discussing the reasons for,
weaknesses of, and responses to oversimplification and generalization in ethics); Carson Strong, Justification in
Ethics, in MORAL TH4EORY AND MORAL JUDGMENTS, supra note 14, at 193, 199 (discussing the shortcomings of
an approach that balances conflicting principles in case-specific medical contexts).
70. Gear, supra note 25, at 2476.
71. Sir David Ross did assert a form of lexical weighting of duties, in his belief that the principle of
nonmalevolence (avoiding harm) ought to take precedence over the principle of beneficence (the production of
good consequences). Ross, supra note 3, at 21-22. Few philosophers believe that the lexical ordering endeavor
is a fruitful one. See Kai Nielsen, On Being Skeptical About Applied Ethics, in CLINICAL MEDICAL ETHICS:
EXPLORATION AND ASSESSMENT 95 (Terrence F. Ackerman et al. eds., 1987) (discussing the concept of "moral
expertise"); Alasdair Maclntyre, Moral Philosophy: What Next?, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 5 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983)(stating that "there are no scales"
for the weighing of competing values).
Aaron Mackler, though, has suggested that lexical ordering is not entirely implausible. AARON LEONARD
MACKLER, CASES AND JUDGMENTS IN ETHICAL REASONING: AN APPRAISAL OF CONTEMPORARY CASUISTRY AND
HOLisnc MODEL FOR THE MUTUAL SUPPORT OF NORMs AND CASE JUDGMENTS 109-13 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with author). Mackler describes the idea of a "lexical consequen-
tialism... offer[ing] a hierarchy of consequentialist appeals," id. at 110, with clearer guidance to practitioners
while being "less vulnerable to abuse" than a model which rests more on intuitive judgments. Id. at I l1.
Mackler's point is not to develop a full lexical ordering theory, however. He proposes it, without great
elaboration, within an argument plausibly rebutting an intuitive model he finds wanting, the "pluralistic
casuistry" of Baruch Brody. See BRODY, supra note 42, at 9-11 (considering "[tihe virtues of a [p]luralistic
[tiheory"). On lexical ordering, see also SUSAN L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS: PERSONALITY AND POLITY 219,
(1989) (suggesting the need for such ordering but not defending a particular scheme).
72. Winkler, supra note 10, at 355. He continues: "[T]he applied ethics model, even when amended by the
methodology of reflective equilibrium, sustains the illusion that bioethics is essentially or primarily a matter of
constructing and applying principles when in fact it is almost anything but this." Id.
73. The most successful and thoughtful of the "new principlism" has been developed by Henry Richardson,
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"coherentism.", 74 These newer principlists acknowledge the casuist's insight that
individual circumstances play an important role in ethical decisionmaking, 75 but
insist upon a collection of "specified" norms to ensure that moral choices are
"tethered" to something more substantial than individual case experiences.
76
These more sophisticated iterations of principlism continue to disappoint, how-
ever. As we shall see more fully below, the norms upon which the principlists
rely, and in particular those defended as more pragmatic and coherent, derive
from considered case judgments; rather than norms driving decisions, norms
reflect and follow from discrete moral experience. The new effort to "specify"
77
norms implies a catalogue of prima facie rules which plain persons ought to
know, understand, and use as they encounter ethical conflict. 78 However, this
who defends what he calls "specified principlism." See Richardson, supra note 31; Richardson, Beyond Good
and Right: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism, 24 PHIL. & PuB. APF. 108, 130-31 (1995) (offering
specification as a means of achieving flexible yet pragmatic norms). The specification arguments have been
furthered by David DeGrazia as well. David DeGrazia, Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases,
and Specified Principlism, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 511, 523-34 (1992). The "specification" insight appears as an
important revision to the original principlist doctrine. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note
10, at 106-08 (replying to criticisms levied in the context of "principle-based, common-morality" theories).
74. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 20-28.
75. Id. at 96-100.
76. "The advantage of thinking of moral reasoning in terms of [Henry R. Richardson's] specification rather
than balancing [of competing principles] is ... that one's final practical judgments remain tethered to a single
principle capable of bestowing rational justification upon them." Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note
10, at 996-97. See also DeGrazia, supra note 73, at 527 (" [Slpecification depends on the possibility of reasoned
criticism afforded by a coherence theory of ethical justification.").
77. Richardson, Specifying Norms, supra note 31, at 279-80 (developing a metaphor of specifying norms to
"resolve concrete ethical problems" when "[s]tarting from an initial set of ethical norms" applied to such
instances to determine what should be done).
78. Richardson uses an example from law to emphasize the usefulness of specified norms. In the case of a
lawyer representing a man accused of rape, the lawyer confronts two inconsistent principles: "It is wrong for
lawyers not to pursue their clients' interests by all means that are lawful" and "[it is wrong to defame
someone's character by knowingly distorting their public reputation." Id. at 281-82. A cross-examination
intended to make sexist jurors believe that the victim consented is supported by the former principle, but barred
by the latter. Rather than simply "balance" the two principles in some fashion, Richardson proposes a more
specified norm which can offer consistent guidance: "It is always wrong to defame a rape victim's character by
knowingly distorting her public reputation." Id. at 283. The resulting specified norm is far less likely to conflict
with other norms, and can be applied with some consistency to future similar cases.
The cross-examination example illustrates the merit of the specification method, but also its inadequacy as a
deliberative method for professionals or other plain persons. In his work, Richardson argues that the norms of
principlism must be understood through the pragmatist insights that stress revisability and tentativeness, and
downplay a reductionist, deductive, or syllogistic thinking. He admirably strives to explicate and unpack the
fuzzy process of balancing norms. His efforts, though, produce an unsatisfying method and leave questions
better answered by a case-driven protocol.
Richardson argues that specified norms have the advantage of being norms, that is, rules or almost-rules
which can direct future conduct. In his cross-examination example, the specified norm will direct conduct, and
resolve ethical conflict, in future litigation in a way that the more generalized norms ("be a zealous advocate";
"do not defame") cannot. But that very goal of specification creates its most serious problems as a working
deliberative method for plain persons. Richardson claims that, under this model, "without further deliberative
work, simple inspection of the specified norms will often indicate which option should be chosen." Id. at 294.
Norms, then, must be available for "inspection." Because the specified norms do not develop on a case-by-case
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suggestion not only overestimates the facility of most individuals, but offers
nothing that the casuists alternative cannot offer in a more accessible fashion.
C. VIRTUE ETHICS
Before we examine the casuists' arguments in detail, we need to explore a final,
alternative deliberative method, known best as "virtue ethics." Virtue ethics
responds to the fundamental difficulty of principlism, that is, the aspiration for
formal norms alongside the need for flexible application of these norms, by
privileging questions of character. The question we assess briefly here is whether
virtue ethics meets the concerns arising from theory and principles in a way that
might be helpful to Mark, as some of its adherents claim.79
Virtue ethics, as this new paradigm has come to be known,8° resists conceiving
basis as practice proceeds, but instead exist as specified, antecedent action-guides, the deliberator needs access
to them. As specified norms, they are many. Richardson offers a norm for rape trial defense lawyers; one
assumes that a similar norm can be developed for tobacco lawyers, or Ford's lawyers defending against product
liability cases after Pinto fires, or real estate lawyers foreclosing upon the widow who recently lost her job. It
quickly becomes apparent that no such comprehensive catalogue of specified norms can exist or can be
available to deliberators who need to act in some reasonable fashion.
The central argument of the specification model, as of principlism generally, is that without norms, ethical
choice is left "un-tethered," that is, unconnected to some grander theoretical picture. But norms imply
rule-following. If the norms are general, they will be too abstract, and they will frequently conflict. If they are
specified, those concerns may be met, but the resulting norms will be so numerous to demand some form of
cataloging. Further, while Richardson takes pains to deny that specified norms, or any norms for that matter, can
be applied in a deductive, rules-based fashion, his examples are developed to apply in that fashion. If they are
only presumptive - if, for instance, some rape victims may be defamed in some cases - then his method
leaves those cases in the same arbitrariness as the norm-conflicts which he hopes to resolve.
A more significant challenge, though, concerns how Richardson arrives at his specified norms. In his
cross-examination example, by what deliberative method did he conclude that concern for defamation of the
victim trumped a winning defense.for the man charged with the crime? He is right, at least most of the time, but
by what higher-order process do we know he is right? John Arras identifies this as a deep blemish on the
sophisticated principlism scheme. Responding to David DeGrazia's specification arguments, Arras writes:
Just as the competing principles of reproductive autonomy and "nonmaleficence" appear to require
ad hoc, context specific, nuanced judgments unsupported by higher level, lexically ordered principles,
so too will efforts to specify the principle of reproductive freedom down to the level of the particular
case.... Unless DeGrazia has a rationally defensible, higher level, lexical ordering principle at his
disposal, his "specifiers" are in the same boat as the principlists' "weighers and balancers."
Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note 10, at 997.
79. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 888 (1996) ("[N]either Kantianism nor utilitarianism holds the promise for legal ethics that
virtue ethics does.").
80. The phrase is now commonplace. See, e.g., GRABER & THOMASMA, supra note 10, at 151-72 ("Virtue
Model"); RHODE, supra note 44, at 19-20 ("Virtue-based theories"); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 29, at 9-10
("virtue ethics"); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 62-69 ("character ethics:
virtue-based theory"); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy
and "The Manner That Is the Man Himself," 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PO.'Y 145, 146 (1993)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Vouching for Clients] ("Aristotelian virtue ethics"); Loder, Out of Uncertainty, supra note
55, at 126 (same). Most writers visiting this approach credit Alasdair Maclntyre for reviving interest in the
virtues within late twentieth century applied professional ethics. See MACIrYRE, supra note 9 (discussing
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of ethics as a matter of individual choice, a conception Edmund Pincoffs refers to,
"for convenience and disparagement, as Quandary Ethics." 8' Virtue ethics urges,
instead, a focus on the character of the actor rather than the quality of the action.
The primary object of moral evaluation is neither the act nor its consequences,
but the agent - "which type of activity will make the agent a better or more
prudent agent in the future." 82 There is a teleological element to this reasoning, to
be sure: a person of great character will make the best moral choices by living the
best moral life.8 3 But the argument is not only teleological. Virtuists hold that
motive is an essential element of moral assessment; to do the "correct" thing is
less important than to act for the "correct" motive.84 "Accordingly, one who is
disposed by character to have the right motives and desires is the basic model of
the moral person. Our ideal professional practitioner should be not the rule
follower, but the person "disposed by character to be generous, caring, compas-
sionate, sympathetic, fair, and the like....
The virtue ethics perspective does more than merely elevate the question of
character above the question of proper ethical analysis of quandaries; it also
privileges the stories and the relationships forming the fabric of the actors' lives
virtue and moral theory). Significant pioneers in virtue ethics who preceded Maclntyre include Elizabeth
Anscombe and Philippa Foot. See, e.g., G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1
(1958); PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978).
81. Edmund Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, 80 MIND 552, 552 (1971). Pincoffs contrasts his critique with the
following view he quotes from the casuist Stephen Toulmin: "Ethics is everybody's concern.... Everyone ...
is faced with moral problems - problems about which, after more or less reflection, a decision must be
reached." STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETHICS 1 (1970).
82. Keenan, supra note 9, at 116. Martha Nussbaum similarly argues: "The starting point of an Aristotelian
inquiry in ethics is the question, 'How should a human being live?'... And the general answer... suggested by
Aristotle himself is, 'In accordance with all the forms of good functioning that make up a complete human
life.' "Martha C. Nussbaum, The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public
Rationality, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 54, 95 (1990) [hereinafter
Nussbaum, Discernment of Perception].
83. Nussbaum, Discernment of Perception, supra note 82, at 95; Keenan, supra note 9, at 116-17. Keenan
notes that virtue ethics "presupposes that one becomes the agent of the actions one performs and that therefore
the self-understanding of the agent is necessary for determining the course of action." Id. at 116. Martha
Nussbaum describes the quality of practical reason that one with good character acquires as "one of becoming
'finely aware and richly responsible'; of being a person on whom nothing is lost." Nussbaum, Discernment of
Perception, supra note 82, at 84 (citation omitted).
84. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 64 ("Virtue is intimately connected to
characteristic motives. We care morally about how persons are motivated .... Properly motivated persons often
do not merely follow rules; they also have a morally appropriate desire to act as they do."); Keenan, supra note
9, at 117. The early twentieth century ethicist G.E. Moore recognized the following paradox: "[A] man may
really deserve the strongest moral condemnation for choosing an action, which actually is right." G.E. MOORE,
ETHICS 195 (1912).
85. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 65 (citing PHILIPPA FOOT, supra note 80);
RODGER BEEHLER, MORAL LIFE (1978); Gregory W. Trianosky, Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice: On the
Autonomy of the Ethics of Virtue, 83 J. PHIL. 26 (1986).
86. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 65-66.
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and their communities over the sterile assessment of competing principles.87
"For the telos in fact is a narrative, and the good is not so much a clearly defined
'end' as it is a sense of the journey on which that community finds itself."88 With
a developed character, the argument goes, there are, in fact, few questions of
"quandaries" at all. "Quandaries" and "decisions" assume "a relationship
between persons that is mechanistic.", 89 Those foci also encourage an assumption
that "I am the only party making decisions in the total process." 90 Rather than
recognizing the moral life as one embedded in a community of caring relation-
ships, the traditional models we have explored thus far tend to atomize individu-
als and distort the felt reality of compassion and obligation.9 '
The virtuists represent ambitious exemplars of the strong critique of deductive
ethics noted above,9 2 which objected to the primary reliance on theory for moral
deliberation not merely because of the intransigent disagreement about theory
among philosophers and the abstruse quality of that theoretical discourse (this
represented the weak objection), but more importantly because theory fails to
correspond to the existential truth of moral understanding. This objection denies
theory a prominent place within moral deliberation because moral deliberation
does not and cannot proceed along theoretical lines. It is an objection that is
central to the virtue ethics tradition.
Replacing theory and rules within virtue ethics are the concepts of narrative
and stories. In Aristotelian ethics, "the discernment rests with perception,",
93
where "discernment" is wisdom, and the "perception" arises from the particulari-
ties and the concrete.94 Calling this the "priority of the particular," 95 Martha
Nussbaum uses that insight to challenge those, like Plato, who would wish that
ethics could be governed by rules, abstract principles, and universal truths. In the
intellectual tradition of feminism, pragmatism, and postmodernism, however, the
virtuists discredit and undermine that Cartesian and Platonic ideal.
The concern with virtue ethics, though, continues to be its slipperiness in
application. However persuasive the argument that character matters more than
individual acts, it is nevertheless true that professionals who turn to questions of
ethics are searching for guidance in some concrete and discrete matter. The
87. Alasdair Maclntyre, Theology, Ethics and the Ethics of Medicine and Health Care: Comments on Papers
by Novak, Mouw, Roach, Cahill, and Hartt, 4 J. MED. & PHIL. 435 (1979).
88. Stanley Hauerwas, Casuistry as Narrative Art, 37 INTERPRETATION 377, 379 (1983).
89. Id. at 383.
90. John Yoder, "What Would You Do If... ?": An Exercise in Situation Ethics, 2 J. REL. ETHICS 81, 82
(1974).
91. See Shaffer, Vouching for Clients, supra note 80, at 146 (developing an "argument for Aristotelian virtue
ethics" based upon friendship).
92. See text accompanying supra notes 31-49 (addressing deductivistic weaknesses).
93. Nussbaum, Discernment of Perception, supra note 82, at 66.
94. Id. at 74. "Practical insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is noninferential, nondeductive; it is an
ability to recognize the salient features of a complex situation." Id.
95. Id. at 66.
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"quandary ethics" critique notwithstanding, situational dilemmas motivate most
professionals to explore concepts of morality. Compared to its "competitors,"
96
virtue ethics offers meager guidance to actors confronting moral conflict; the
admonitions "be courageous" or "be compassionate" are of little assistance to an
attorney struggling with a client who is engaging in welfare fraud in order to feed
her children.
This observation is acknowledged by both virtue ethics adherents and its
critics.9 7 To some adherents, the criticism is not cogent, because such is the
nature of moral experience. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, echoing Aristotle:
"there is no general rule for this, the discrimination rests with perception."
' 98
Other virtuists, though, sympathize with those who desire greater guidance. 99
The critics of virtue ethics are even more troubled by the ambiguity and "misty
antiquarian" '00 feel of the character-ethics teachings and its resistance to system-
atic guidance.''
96. See Keenan, supra note 9, at 116-17 (referring to the alternative ethical models as "competitors" of
virtue ethics).
97. At least two virtuists have argued that virtue ethics in fact can serve as concrete guidance in particular
moral contexts. See Keenan, supra note 9, at 119 (attempting to articulate a "virtue casuistry" which "can give
concrete moral guidance and therefore can replace other forms of moral reasoning"); Caryn L. Beck-Dudley,
No More Quandaries: A Look At Virtue Through The Eyes of Robert Solomon, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 117 (reviewing
ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS (1993)). Beck-
Dudley offers examples of Solomon's efforts to use virtue ethics in a specific business law setting, but, as her
descriptions ultimately show, the softness of the virtue standards make the application complicated. See id. at
130 (after explaining a bonus distribution problem, Beck-Dudley concludes, "These considerations show that
even in this simple scenario, applying a uniform 'brand' of justice is very difficult. Ultimately, justice is tied to
caring.").
98. Nussbaum, Discernment of Perception, supra note 82, at 97. Nussbaum compares the practical wisdom
of a virtuous actor to that of an experienced navigator, who cannot translate her judgments about how to steer a
craft into a set of rules or principles:
The answer shows another dimension of the priority of the particular in good deliberation. For it must
be: there is no general rule for this, the discrimination rests with perception. The experienced
navigator will sense when to follow the rule book and when to leave it aside. The "right rule" in such
matters is simply: do it the way an experienced navigator would do it. There is no safe guarantee at all,
no formula, and no shortcut.
Id.
99. See, e.g., Thomas D. Eisele, Avalon Ethics, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1287, 1309 (1992)(reviewing
THOMAS L. SHAFFER AND MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEm COMMUNITIES: ETHIcs IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION) ("I think that all those working in this area (among whom I number myself) need to think
long and hard about the implications of our claims concerning 'virtue ethics' for our understanding of the
morality of human actions and decisions."); Loder, Out of Uncertainty, supra note 55, at 128 n.152 ("Those
who seek assistance in deciding what course of action to follow in a given case find the emphasis in virtue ethics
unsatisfactory.").
100. Robert B. Louden, On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 227, 227 (1984).
101. For several critics' viewpoints, see, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 69
(evaluating character ethics constructively); Louden, supra note 100 (critiquing virtue ethics and calling for
virtue ethics and rule ethics to be coordinated instead of viewed as opposites); VIRGINIA HELD, RIGHTS AND
GOODS: JUSTIFYING SOCIAL ACTION 25 (1984) (observing that virtue ethics may be "as remote from actual
realities as a morality that constructs abstract principles of justice, equality, and liberty suitable only for an ideal
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It is, it seems, precisely this weakness of the virtue ethics model that casuistry
can help overcome. Casuistry shares with the virtuists the strong objections to
deductivism and principlism. 10 2 The "priority of the particular" 10 3 is an Aristote-
lian insight upon which casuistry, like virtue ethics, is constructed. Like the
virtuists, the casuists recognize the significance of phronesis, as opposed to
episteme, within the realm of moral reasoning.' 04 But unlike the virtuists, who
have little to say about discrete choice in recognized contexts, the casuists have a
great deal to say.
105
III. A PRAGMATIC ALTERNATIVE: CASUISTRY, CLINICAL ETHICS,
AND CASE-BASED REASONING
A debate is in the offing, similar to the deconstructionist debate in literary
studies and to the critical legal studies argument in jurisprudence, between the
"philosophers "and the "casuists."
Albert Jonsen
1 0 6
Medical ethics today must, indeed, be "casuistry"; it must deal as competently
and exhaustively as possible with the concrete features of actual moral
decisions of life and death and medical care.
Paul Ramsey
10 7
A. THE NEW CASUISTRY
Albert Jonsen's quote highlights the significant division among ethicists on the
world"); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 29, at 9 ("To focus on virtue in legal ethics means to turn attention away
from the nature of particular actions and their consequences and to focus instead on... character .....
102. See text accompanying supra notes 31-49 and 91 (discussing the deductive moral theory).
103. Nussbaum, supra note 82, at 66.
104. Compare id. at 82-84 (defending "a coherent picture of particular choice" as "becoming 'finely aware
and richly responsible,' " quoting HENRY JAMES, THE PRINCESS CASAMASSIMA 169 (1909)), with JONSEN &
TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 26, 294 (contrasting experiential phronesis with abstract, theoretically obtained
episteme).
105. The importance of a more rigorous guidance within ethical inquiry is illustrated by the following Albert
Jonsen observation, which he directs toward the theorists but which applies equally, if not better, to the virtuists:
It is my opinion that moral philosophy, as it has been done in recent times, provides little guidance
through cases. It points to the impressive structure of theory and principle and says to the perplexed,
"There it is, explore and learn from it," just as a tour leader might point to the Louvre or the
Metropolitan and say, "Go in and look around. You will learn a lot." Casuistry goes further. It points
to the case and says, "You will find this case full of facts and maxims. Here is a plan that will route
you through and call attention to the important ones. When you emerge, you will better understand the
case and even be able to tell others where to look for the relevant features."
Jonsen, Alternative or Complement, supra note 15, at 249.
106. Albert R. Jonsen, Practice Versus Theory, 20 HASTINGS Cm. REP. 32, 34 (July/Aug. 1990) [hereinafter
Jonsen, Practice Versus Theory] (reviewing BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES II, supra note 51; MORAL
THEORY AND MORAL JUDGMENTS IN MEDICAL ETHICS (Baruch Brody ed., 1988); GLENN C. GRABER & DAVID C.
THOMASMA, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1989)).
107. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS xvii (1970).
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question of how best to approach moral choices. The prior discussion showed that
the more traditional or historical approaches to applied ethics rely on methods of
reasoning best described as "scientific," derived from Enlightenment-driven
notions of truth. More recently, both deductivists and virtue ethicists agree that
practical wisdom, judgment, and discernment are central to ethical decisionmak-
ing. The deductivists seek to meld that phronesis with discrete norms, while
virtuists accept a more direct, if not impressionistic, role for the faculty of
discernment. Casuistry, as we shall see, begins to bridge the chasm between the
faux science of principlism and the untetheredness of virtue ethics.
Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, the scholars most responsible for its
revival, describe casuistry as follows:
[Casuistry is] the analysis of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning based
on paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation of expert opinions
about the existence and stringency of particular moral obligations, framed in
terms of rules or maxims that are general but not universal or invariable, since
they hold good with certainty only in the typical conditions of the agent and
circumstances of action. 0 8
Casuistry does not pursue universal truths and it does not rely on foundations of
moral belief derived from some developed intellectual scheme. It instead looks
more modestly, if not intensely, at the circumstances of the particular case that
demand moral inquiry, resisting abstract or formal theories in favor of identifying
paradigm cases from which one can reason analogously and contextually.
Casuistry then arrives at "probable certitude" through the exercise of reflective,
practical judgment. Like principlism, it builds upon shared moral sentiment; like
virtue ethics, it discerns that sentiment in the particulars of cases.
This Article explores the underpinnings of casuistry in the following Part, and
takes up, in Part IV, a comparison of casuistry to its alternatives, through the use
of some examples from clinical law practice. This analysis reveals that casuistry,
while different in its approach from much of conventional ethical discourse, is
surprisingly evocative of common law reasoning with its reliance on precedent
and analogical reasoning. It is also quite illustrative of the actual practice of
108. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 257. A reviewer of the Jonsen and Toulmin book offers this
slightly different description:
Casuistry is the method of ethical case analysis. It is distinguished from analyses that begin with
spiritually known or academically articulated universal ethical rules that are applied to individual
cases. Casuistry begins by fully exposing the details of a case, analogizes to previously discussed
paradigm cases, and arrives at an experienced conclusion about how customary moral obligations
apply in the individual circumstances of the case.
Steven H. Miles, Ethics, 262 JAMA 961, 962 (1989) (reviewing ALBERT JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE
ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988)).
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ethics,' 09 if not of the structured discussion of ethics. In this respect, it can claim
affinity with the traditions of feminism, pragmatism, that part of postmodern
thinking that resists the abstracting effects of theory," ° and early twentieth-
century legal realism.'
B. CASUISTRY'S COMPONENT UNDERSTANDINGS
1. The "Wellsprings question": cases as the source of moral knowledge
Casuistry's most critical premise is that moral knowledge develops incremen-
tally through the analysis of concrete cases. We have already discussed the
weaknesses of moral theory 1 2 and mid-level principles" 13 in practice settings.
Casuists credit theories and principles as developed insights formed from
considered reactions to individual cases. A lawyer understanding that insight can
more readily accept conflict between theories or among principles by looking
more particularly at the cases that account for the competing sentiments. In the
end, the cases drive the sentiment.
Casuistry, thus, is prescriptive. It advises moral actors to think through
questions differently from the manner which a theorist would suggest, by
beginning with cases in context. It is also ontological and metaphysical, in that its
prescription arises from a particular conception of how we know what is right.
That claim, best left to the philosophers for its full defense, warrants some brief
development here.
Let us call this question about the source of moral truth the "wellsprings
question. '" 14 The casuists observe that moral theory seldom has contributed
109. See Arras, Principles and Particularity, supra note 10, at 1001 ("[T]his account of reasoning ...
accurately describes how ethicists actually think, both in clinical situations and in the classroom.").
110. The resistance to theory and attraction to contextual, situation-based reasoning is very prevalent in
modem jurisprudence. As Daniel Farber and Phillip Frickey write, "An impressive array of recent legal
commentary has suggested a movement away from grand theory toward something new, variously called
'intuitionism,' 'prudence,' and 'practical reason.' " Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and
the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1645-46 (1987); see also Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks:
An Essay on DiscoveryAbuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1625-26 (1996) (noting the resurgence of reliance upon
Aristotle in recent legal scholarship); Cornell, supra note 48 (assessing the critique of liberalism in ethics of
Alasdain MacIntyre and Roberto Unger).
11l. The American Legal Realists were skeptical of theory as a determining construct for court decisions,
much as casuists doubt the role which theory plays in moral choice. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal
Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1498, 1498-99 (1996) (contrasting Realism's
inductive process, whereby legal conclusions are determined first and legal justifications are later identified
which support these, with Formalism's deductive process under which law is applied to facts to reach a
conclusion); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Codes and the Arrangements of Law, 44 HARv. L. REV. 725, 725 (1931)
(stating that a court "decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards") (reprinted from 5 AM. L.
REV. I (1870)), quoted in Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741,746 (1993).
112. Supra text accompanying notes 31-50.
113. Supra text accompanying notes 64-78.
114. 1 borrow this phrase from Jonsen and Toulmin. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 294-95 ("the
natural springs of moral action").
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meaningful insights to the resolution of practical problems;1 15 instead, the "locus
of moral certitude" ' 16 remains with the particular cases. What moral theory can
do well, at times, is summarize what we know about moral truth from our
encounters with concrete cases. This insight is not new, and represents an
important part of feminist" 17 and pragmatist" 18 thought.
Consider, for example, a lawyer torn about whether to respect her client's
choice to reconcile with and return to a man who has been physically violent to
her and who has sexually abused their teenage daughter."1 9 She wishes to do what
is best in this circumstance, and to resolve the moral question in the most
appropriate way, whatever that means. ' 20 How she proceeds will depend, at least
in part, on how she comprehends the wellsprings question.
This lawyer will not use theory to resolve her crisis. As developed earlier, the
argument that elaborate theories operate to generate answers is unpersuasive, and
115. Jonsen, Practice Versus Theory, supra note 106, at 33. David Wiggins offers an explanation for the
seduction of deductive schemes:
I entertain the unfriendly suspicion that those who feel they must seek more than all this provides want
a scientific theory of rationality not so much from a passion for science, even where there can be no
science, but because they hope and desire, by some conceptual alchemy, to turn such a theory into a
system of rules by which to spare themselves some of the agony of thinking and all the torment of
feeling and understanding that is actually involved in reasoned deliberation.
David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 237 (A. Rorty ed., 1980)
quoted in Charles Guignon, Existential Ethics 73, 87-88, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 58.
116. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 16.
117. Feminist thought has long championed the personal and the particular over the abstraction and
bloodless rationality of rules and principles. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan wrote of the importance of "the particular," id. at 101,
which "allows the understanding of cause and consequence which engages the compassion and tolerance
repeatedly noted to distinguish the moral judgments of women." Id. at 100. That preference moves women's
thinking "away from the hierarchical ordering of principles and the formal procedures of decision making." Id.
at 101. Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman note that the consideration of "context," which is the equivalent
to the casuists' obsession with the particular, "unites the work of early twentieth-century pragmatists and the
late twentieth-century feminists and critical race theorists." Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context,
in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 247,247 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (citations omitted).
118. Jonsen and Toulmin cite the pragmatists William James and John Dewey as "striking exceptions" to the
abstracting and systematizing efforts of twentieth century philosophers. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at
281. The authors quote William James's thoughts reflecting his acceptance of the priority of the particular:
There is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance .... There
can be no final truth in ethics any more than in physics, until the last man has had his experience and
said his say.
William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in THE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM JAMES 610, 610-11
(John J. McDermott ed., 1977), quoted in JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 282. For further discussion
about the intellectual links between pragmatism and casuistry, see infra note 141.
119. This example represents a true experience from our law school clinical program. For an extended
description of the case written by the clinical professor who supervised the student working on the case, see
Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and
Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901 (1997).
120. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, II GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 19 (1997) (exploring the role that personal moral commitments ought to play in professional choices).
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moral philosophers by and large agree. 12' Theories will, of course, often generate
honorable suggestions, but the honor of the advice is neither measured nor
determined by the theory. Were a sophisticated theory to conclude, for instance,
that slavery is defensible, or that torturing the innocents is acceptable, it is the
theory that would be jettisoned, not the settled views about slavery or torture. 122
This understanding serves as the basis for Rawls's notion of "reflective equilib-
rium," 123 which observes that we reach moral stasis by balancing our "consid-
ered moral judgments" with more universal theories or principles, amending the
latter when they cannot harmonize with the former. 1
24
Theorists seldom assert this crude thesis, though, 125 arguing instead for
121. See text accompanying supra notes 73-78 (discussing a more recent principlist approach).
122. This argument is a frequent and important one in contemporary moral philosophy. See, e.g., STOUT,
supra note 9, at 40 ("If a moral theory implied that raping women was generally a good thing, morally speaking,
all competent moral judges in our community would reject that theory as false."); Strong, supra note 69, at 208
("Any higher-level theory of ethics which turned out to be inconsistent with the middle-level principles would,
in virtue of that inconsistency, be reasonably considered inadequate."); Kai Nelson, On Being Skeptical About
Applied Ethics, in CLINICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: EXPLORATION AND ASSESSMENT 95 (Terrence F. Ackerman et al.
eds., 1987). Kai Nelson borrows from G.E. Moore's skepticism about skepticism to make the point:
Moore pointed out (in effect) that in a rather large cluster of standard contexts I could be more
confident that I have two hands and that I put on my underwear before I put on my pants than I could
be of any philosophical theory, no matter how cogently reasoned, that concluded that there is no
external world or that time is unreal. It is more reasonable to believe the empirical truisms and assume
that somewhere there is a yet undetected lacuna in the philosophical argument than to accept the
philosophical argument and reject the empirical truisms.
Similarly, in moral domains, it is more reasonable to believe that we know or can reasonably
believe or reasonably securely accept that it is wrong to kill people just for the fun of it, torture the
innocent, treat a person simply as a means to one's own ends, routinely fail to keep one's promises,
break faith with people and the like than to accept any philosophical theory which claims we cannot
know or reasonably believe or reasonably securely accept that we may not do such things.
Id. at 101-02.
123. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 49.
124. For an exploration of the role that considered moral judgments play in the process of "reflective
equilibrium," see Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL.
256 (1979) (arguing for an important place for theory in the process of reflective equilibrium); Margaret
Holmgran, The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium, 19 CAN. J. PHIL. 43 (1989) (disputing Daniels' claim
for a greater role for theory).
Cass Sunstein acknowledges the affinity between the analogical reasoning of casuistry and reflective
equilibrium, arguing that the latter unnecessarily theorizes a process that can achieve its purposes without that
added abstraction. Sunstein, supra note 111, at 753, 781-83.
125. The philosopher Raymond Devettere writes that "No serious moral philosopher or theologian
advocating principles and rules reduces ethics to this [deductive formulation]." Devettere, supra note 67, at 137;
see also Winkler, supra note 10, at 354 ("[T]here are very few strict deductivists left in bioethics"). The same
point made here has been made within the jurisprudential debate about the role of theory as determinative of
judge's actions. See Scott J. Shapiro, Fear of Theory, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 389, 395 (1997). Shapiro notes:
most reasonable ethical theories generally produce the same results. Utilitarians, Kantians[,] and
Aristotelians all think they can explain why we should keep our promises, give to charity, and refrain
from murder. This "overlapping consensus" is hardly surprising - if any of these theories conflicted
with a large number of our moral intuitions, we would have rejected it long ago.
Id. at 400.
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theory's usefulness as a corrigible source of moral insight. 126 But that argument
does not seem to fare much better, however. To assert that the simple theorist
version is untenable is to suggest that we rely on some discernment or faculty to
decide when we would accept the theory-derived conclusions and when we
would not. This understanding is difficult to square with the theorists' wellsprings
stance. If we rely on something outside of theory to determine when to reject the
theory, then the theory itself will seldom be of use in cases of deep conflict.' 27 In
those cases in which we accept the theory's solution, we have done so because of
a considered discernment that the solution is acceptable, not because of the
theory itself. And in those cases where we have rejected the theory-derived
solution, we are obviously influenced by something outside the theory. In either
event, it is not theory that provides the guidance. 1
28
It is therefore not at all implausible for lawyers to accept the critical premise of
casuistry - that moral insight stems from the particularities of concrete cases.
This is not meant to deny theory an important place in moral deliberation, nor to
ignore the insights of theoretical moral philosophy. Each competing moral theory
represents sentiments derived from paradigm cases, and can summarize those
sentiments in effective ways. A welcome benefit of casuistry, in fact, is that one
can accept the arguments of competing theories selectively, without concluding
that the theory is defective when a counter-example appears for which the theory
cannot account. 1
29
2. The Role of Paradigm Cases and Analogical Reasoning
Theories and principles, despite their faults, offer a semblance of comfort. The
worry is that their absence leaves only relativism, or perhaps nihilism. 130 The
casuists avoid despair by recognizing the centrality of paradigm cases, "in which
the actions to be taken are clear and agreed on by virtually anyone familiar with
126. This is among the more sophisticated arguments defended by Beauchamp and Childress. BEAuCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 100-01. It reflects the insights of W.D. Ross about prima facie
obligations. See Ross, supra note 3, at 19-20 (describing his conception of prima facie duties). By "corrigible,"
I mean that the theory or the principle serves as a presumptive or prima facie basis of action, unless
contraindicated by competing moral concerns.
127. See Shapiro, supra note 125, at 399 ("[General] theories are scarcely relevant in adjudication.").
128. For different versions of this fundamental argument, see STOUT, supra note 9, at 40; Baier, supra note
45; Clarke & Simpson, supra note 33, at 8-9; Stephen Toulmin, Ethics and Equity: The Tyranny of Principles,
15 LAW Soc. GAzETTE 240, 242 (1981) [hereinafter Toulmin, Ethics and Equity]. Toulmin elaborates on this
point in his work with Albert Jonsen. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 296-303.
129. KuczEwsKI, supra note 13, at 87-88.
130. Some critics of casuistry profess this concern. See Kevin Wm. Wildes, The Priesthood of Bioethics and
the Return of Casuistry, 18 J. MED. & PwL. 33 (1993) (arguing that several casuistries will emerge without a
shared common ground of morals and values); Tom Tomlinson, Casuistry in Medical Ethics: Rehabilitated, Or
Repeat Offender?, 15 THEOR. MED. 14, 18 (1994); cf Clouser & Gert, supra note 51, at 230-31 (claiming that
principlism's use of analogical reasoning is relativistic). For a response, see Cheryl Noble, Normative Ethical
Theories, in Clarke & Simpson, supra note 33, at 49,49-50.
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the case and its particulars." 131 The force of paradigm cases is largely intui-
tive.1 32 Once she identifies one or more paradigm cases, a casuist proceeds in a
fashion quite familiar to lawyers: she employs a common law reasoning style,
1 33
comparing the case at hand with a collection of available easy cases. Through
"moral triangulation," she reasons by analogy from the exemplars, identifying
the morally relevant features of the paradigm cases, the features of the cases
which account for their ready acceptance,134 and comparing the newer, less
certain case with each paradigm case to discern which comes closest to the case
under consideration. 
135
A review of the casuistry literature illustrates an assumption, rather than an
explicit defense, of the notion of paradigm cases. That defense, though, seems not
too difficult to establish. 136 The assumption about agreement on easy cases
follows in a self-evident way from the very discussion of ethics. Of course, the
nihilist or the relativist might object to the idea of such baseline agreement, but
they have no interest in the present moral deliberation project, and neither do we
care about their skepticism, at least for now. We discuss topics like casuistry only
when the participants wish to make more informed moral decisions. 137 Partici-
pants who would assert that all values are nothing more than personal preferences
131. KuczEwsKl, supra note 13, at 72. Albert Jonsen's definition of a paradigm case is as follows:
This would be a case in which the circumstances were clear, the relevant maxim unambiguous and the
rebuttals weak, in the minds of almost any observer. The claim that this action is wrong (or right) is
widely persuasive. There is little need to present arguments for the rightness (or wrongness) of the
case and it is very hard to argue against its rightness (or wrongness).
Albert R. Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology in Clinical Ethics, 12 THEOR. MED. 295, 301 (1991) [hereinafter
Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology]
132. See BEDAU, supra note 2, at 102 ("Casuistry as a method of practical reasoning tends to rely on some
form of intuitionism as well as on some set of moral norms more or less beyond dispute."). This sentiment does
not represent what Jeffrey Stout has called "intuitionism," or the belief that noninferential reports about
normative matters are necessarily "incorrigible, indubitable, infallible, [or] immediately demonstrable." See
STouT, supra note 9, at 41.
133. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 121-35 (defending analogical reasoning in light of the weaknesses of
rules-based reasoning).
134. Strong, supra note 69, at 203.
135. This process has been termed "morisprudence" because of its resemblance to the legal case method of
analysis. See Stephen Toulmin, The Case for Cosmic Prudence, 56 TENN. L. REv. 29, 39 (1988) [hereinafter
Toulmin, Cosmic Prudence]; John D. Arras, Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, 16 J.
MED. & PHIL. 29, 33 (1991) [hereinafter Arras, Getting Down to Cases]. The resemblance is not perfect,
however. The jurisprudential concept relies on stare decisis, with a presumptive mandate to follow precedent
regardless of the judge's assessment of the correctness of a prior ruling. Casuistry implies no such rigidity. Larry
Alexander, apcepting a similar distinction between the role of paradigm cases in law and in ethics, argues that
the binding nature of precedent within law leaves analogical reasoning a poor method for resolving legal
disputes. Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 57, 82-86 (1996).
136. In at least one setting in which I presented an earlier version of this Article, the participants found the
concept of paradigm cases difficult to accept. As I develop below, for purposes of a pragmatic casuistry, our
ability to discuss moral concepts itself demonstrates the existence of paradigm cases.
137. The "discussion," indeed, often will be with oneself, as when a lawyer will need to make a rapid
judgment call without the benefit of a dialogue with others.
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have no reason to be talking about ethics at all. And for the rest, their presence
assumes some common agreement (e.g., "torture of the innocents is wrong").
Another way of recognizing the fundamental availability of paradigm cases is
through the analysis of moral conflict. A nihilist or true relativist experiences no
moral conflict (how could they?), but the rest of us do so often. That conflict is the
result of two competing but incompatible "principles" (to borrow from the
earlier discussion) seeming to apply to a new case. Each of those principles
represents an easier case where no such conflict exists. It is inconceivable -
literally so - that one can respect a principle without acknowledging an easy
case where that principle would fit. It would be an odd principle indeed that could
not be described by an example demonstrating it. In Mark's case, for illustration,
he easily concludes that he would never ethically lie to a welfare official in order
to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled. He equally easily concludes that
he would never refuse to make a direct argument applying law to facts as a legal
advocate for a client who had hired him to respect her rights. He may call these
conclusions "principles," but they really arise from cases. His current dilemma
arises because he cannot use either of these cases as a simple analogy for his
current plight.
It makes sense, then, at least in the pragmatic way described here, for lawyers
to work from the paradigm cases they readily recognize. Like their use of
precedent in common law jurisprudence, paradigm cases establish a common
shared basis from which to craft moral arguments and to make moral choices.
3. "Fallibilism" and "Probable Certitude"
Casuists claim that their approach to moral deliberation differs from that of the
theorists and the principlists in an important way.' 38 The respective methods vary
in the way they utilize shared agreements arising from considered judgments.
One touted difference is that casuists do not pretend to secure certainty about the
case before them,1 39 accepting instead what they call "probable certitude."
138. See, e.g., JONSEN & TOULMiN, supra note 12, at 329-30 (discussing John Arras's question whether
deducing answers from principles is any different from the casuistic reasoning from paradigm cases). See also
Arras, Getting Down to Cases, supra note 135, at 39-41 (questioning whether casuistry functions without the
use of either "ethical principles or [a] theoretical apparatus").
139. JONSFN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 293-96; KuczEwsri, supra note 13, at 69. The casuists and the
virtuists argue for "probable certitude" as though it is distinctly different from the goals of the competing
theorist model. That conclusion is entirely evident conceptually. The principlist model resembles an effort to
achieve the level of scientific rationality that ethicists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries pursued.
For examples of these systemization efforts, see HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETucs (4th ed. 1890); C.D.
BROAD, FtvE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY (1930). A precursor to both of these influential texts might be Henry
More, a Fellow of Christ's College at Cambridge in the seventeenth century, whose circle became known as the
Cambridge Platonists, and who attempted to craft a systematic and axiomatic approach to ethics. See Toulmin,
Cosmic Prudence, supra note 135, at 37-38 (describing Henry More's work).
If, conceptually, the theorists look as though they pursue the holy grail of certain and universal truth, an
examination of their texts belies that conclusion. The leading principlists, Beauchamp and Childress, deny
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Casuistry's goal is the best solution, all things considered.' 40 This approach is
evocative of pragmatism, especially Charles Peirce and John Dewey's conception of
"fallibilism." 141 Cass Sunstein notes that this pragmatic search for "principled consis-
tency" within practical reasoning represents, "[a]t least under real-world constraints,
... what we mean by truth, or right answers, in law or even morality." 1
42
Despite the humility of this concession, casuistry actually offers more concrete
assistance than the alternative paradigms. Theorists promise at once too much
and too little; aiming for "applied ethics," principlism can imply a geometric and
hence reasonably certain resolution to practical problems, 43 only ultimately to
disappoint.t44 At the same time, moral philosophers often promise no such help at
all, taking the high road of academic inquiry. 145 As Albert Jonsen writes:
The casuist and the moral philosopher will differ greatly on this point. The
moral philosopher will often warn the audience, "I do not presume to deliver an
answer; I merely examine the process of thought whereby you might seek your
own answer." The casuist would say, "You must, of course, make your own
decision, but I can offer you a resolution to the problem which others, on due
aspiration to a geometric-like resolution of moral conflict. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra
note 10, at 107 ("[W]e acknowledge that conflicts among principles cannot be resolved a priori."). Even more
theory-friendly ethicists, such as Ronald Green, K. Danner Clouser, and Bernard Gert, recognize the importance
of judgment in applying theory to whatever facts are represented in the case at hand. Green, Method in
Bioethics, supra note 64; Clouser & Gert, supra note 51, at 234-45.
140. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 304.
141. See Franklin G. Miller et al., Clinical Pragmatism: John Dewey and Clinical Ethics, 13 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'y 27 (1996) (appraising the paradigm shift in bioethics from principlism to "clinical ethics,"
showing how the emphasis within clinical ethics on tentative, best-under-the-circumstances conclusions
emanates from the work of the early twentieth-century pragmatists). The "fallibilism" doctrine originated with
Peirce as a portrayal of scientific thought. See id., at 32, citing Charles Peirce, The Scientific Attitude and
Fallibilism, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF CHARLES PEIRCE 42-60 (Justus Buchler ed., 1955). Dewey
extended Peirce's fallibilism to the domain of moral value, where it fits into the casuist enterprise. Id., citing
John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (1929) in 4 JoHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. 1981).
Casuist writers and commentators frequently acknowledge the connection between early twentieth-century
pragmatism and the revived casuistry. See, e.g., JONSEN & TOJLMIN, supra note 12, at 281-83 (discussing
William James' pragmatism); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a
New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395 (1994) (analyzing pragmatism's influence in bioethics); Susan
M. Wolf, Foreword: Bioethics-From Mirror to Window, 15 ST. LouiS U. PUB. L. REv. 183 (1996) (discussing
bioethics and law symposium recognizing the deconstruction of traditional paradigms in bioethics); William J.
Winslade, Ethics Consultation: Cases in Context, 57 ALB. L. REv. 679, 683 (1994) (offering a personal glimpse
into his becoming an ethics consultant influenced by pragmatism); see also supra note 111 (listing sources that
discuss legal realism's skepticism of theory "as a determining construct for court decisions").
142. Sunstein, supra note 111, at 778.
143. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing principlism). See also Noble, supra note 130,
at 50 ("It goes without saying that the philosophers who are engaging themselves in the formulation and
analysis of normative theories regard themselves as having rejected a scientific model for ethics, but in
fundamental ways they have not done so.").
144. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing same).
145. See Richard M. Fox & Joseph P. DeMarco, The Challenge of Applied Ethics, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
ETHICS 1, 12, supra note 58 ("[Plhilosophers engaged in applied ethics have sometimes been ridiculed and even
ignored by their more theoretically oriented colleagues.").
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examination, have found reasonable. If your case is the same or closely
analogous, this resolution is likely to be the best one." 1
46
4. The Role of Phronesis and the Importance of Context
Casuistry is impatient with "thin" descriptions of moral dilemmas and with
simple hypothetical examples. It resists abstraction, claiming that appropriate
judgments are only found when all of the relevant circumstances are understood.
Like feminist thought, 147 casuistry understands knowledge to be contextually
acquired. Lawyers acting in good faith will understand and learn not by carefully
deducing propositions through chains of reasoning, but instead by the faculty of
judgment, prudence, or Aristotle's phronesis.148 Here the casuists and the
virtuists meet. 149 Good ethical judgment takes into consideration relevant relation-
ships, roles, power imbalances, emotional needs, community expectations, vulner-
abilities, and so forth, just as the virtue ethics adherents profess.'is
This characteristic of casuistry has implications for the teaching of ethics, if
not for the teaching of law practice generally.'15  It demands "thick" descriptions
of context. '5 2 Sophisticated hypothetical problems may work, but even they will
usually lack sufficient texture. It is the clinic that offers the most promising
environment for students to experience the levels of tension and ambiguity
necessary to develop practical judgment. 151
146. Jonsen, On Being a Casuist, supra note 15, at 124 (emphasis in original).
147. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990) (identifying and
critically examining feminist legal methods and suggesting that knowledge is based upon experience); Phyllis
Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 1599
(1991) (examining the relationship between theory and practice in feminist jurisprudence).
148. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 19. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 1140b4 (defining
prudence as "a disposition with true reason and ability for actions concerning what is good or bad for man").
For a discussion of the role of practical wisdom in law school clinical teaching, see Mark Aaronson, We Ask You
to Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLNICAL L. REv. 247 (1998) [hereinafter
Aaronson, Practical Judgment in Lawyering].
149. See text accompanying supra notes 102-04 (discussing the similarities between causistry and the
virtuists).
150. E.g., Nussbaum, Discernment of Perception, supra note 82.
151. Many have argued that good lawyering requires the same kind of attention to judgment, nuance, and
complexity that casuistry demands in ethical decisionmaking. See, e.g., Aaronson, Practical Judgment in
Lawyering, supra note 148; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century Perspective, 34
J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about
Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 555 (1980); Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1731 (1993); Spiegel, Theory and Practice, supra note 5.
152. See Arras, Getting Down to Cases, supra note 135, at 37 ("[H]ypothetical cases, so beloved of
academic philosophers, tend to be theory-driven."); Jonsen, On Being a Casuist, supra note 15, at 117 ("It is a
truism in bioethics that one should focus on cases and that teaching is best done through cases.").
153. Casuists working within bioethics have made this point repeatedly. See, e.g., Arras, Getting Down to
Cases, supra note 134, at 37 ("Real cases ... are more likely to display the sort of moral complexity and
untidiness that demand the (non-deductive) weighing and balancing of competing moral considerations and the
casuistical virtues of discernment and practical judgment (phronesis)."). The benefit of the clinical setting in
law schools to the teaching of legal ethics has long been recognized as well. See, e.g., Luban & Millemann,
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Casuistry not only demands context, but it also insists upon a form of
expertise."' All practitioners are not equally "wise." Those who are better at
casuistry, and therefore at moral reasoning itself, are those who have developed
the wisdom, or the phronesis, necessary to develop considered moral judgments.
These experts need not be moral philosophers; indeed, there is good reason to
doubt whether philosophers have any special insight into the proper resolution of
practical moral problems. '55 At the same time, though, the wisdom so admired by
casuists and Aristotelians is not unrelated to philosophical study. As Martha
Nussbaum notes, immersion in the humanities and in fiction is an important and
perhaps necessary means to achieving the practical wisdom that persons of great
character exemplify.1 56 The idea of "moral expertise" integrates learning and
practice. In this way, casuistry acknowledges the contributions of philosophical
study while rejecting much of the methodology of modem applied ethics.
5. Casuistry's Rekindling of the Art of Rhetoric
The final component of the new casuistry is its emphasis on a form of argument
that has sparse explicit place in modern discourse: that of rhetoric. Rhetoric, like
casuistry, has developed a notably pejorative connotation in recent times.' 5 7 To
the new casuists, this understanding of rhetoric is unfortunate, and misses
supra note 5; Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, supra note 4; Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral
Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9 (1995) [hereinafter Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism]; O'Sullivan,
supra note 5. See also Gear, supra note 25, at 2476 (reflecting the tension of ethical conflict felt in a clinical
experience). For an early articulation of this premise, see Amsterdam, supra note 151. For more pessimistic or
critical arguments about the benefits of clinical legal education and the training of moral lawyers, see Robert J.
Condlin, Clinical Education in the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 604 (1983);
Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling ": The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 35 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 45 (1986); cf. KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 113-21 (insisting that the Socratic method of appellate case
analysis is one of the best ways to teach phronesis).
154. See supra note 108, depicting Jonsen and Toulmin's definition of casuistry to include "the formulation
of expert opinions" as a component of casuistry.
155. In this regard the casuists reintroduce and confirm, in many ways, the clich6 of academic "ivory tower"
types whose theories have little application to the rough-and-tumble of the real world. The debate about the role
of philosophers in the practice of medical ethics is a rich one, if only because of the regular use of such
"experts" in hospitals, usually as part of "ethics committees." For a glimpse into this literature, see, e.g., E.
Haavi Morreim, Philosophy Lessonsfrom the Clinical Setting: Seven Sayings That Used to Annoy Me, 7 THEOR.
MED. 47 (1986); Loretta M. Kopelman, What Is Applied about "Applied" Philosophy?, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 199
(1990); Larry R. Churchill & Alan W. Cross, Moralist, Technician, Sophist, Teacher/Learner: Reflections on the
Ethicist in the Clinical Setting, 7 THEOR. MED. 3 (1986); Franqoise Baylis, Persons with Moral Expertise and
Moral Experts: Wherein Lies the Difference?, in THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 89; Arthur L. Caplan,
Moral Experts and Moral Expertise: Do Either Exist?, in THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 59.
156. Nussbaum, Discernment of Perception, supra note 82, at 74-75. This same point has been made
powerfully in a recent magazine article. See Earl Shorris, On the Uses of a Liberal Education: As a Weapon in
the Hands of the Restless Poor, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1997, at 50 (using literature to reach poor adolescents).
157. See WEBSTER'S TmIRD NEW ITERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1946 (1971) (defining rhetoric, inter alia, as
"artificial elegance of language: discourse without conviction or earnest feeling"). A "rhetorical" question, in
common conversation, is one that does not anticipate an answer, or which readily implies one. To describe an
argument as "rhetoric" is to convey the argument's flourish at the expense of its substance.
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entirely the quality of argument that rhetoric represented in classical Greece and
in ancient Rome. 158 The qualities of classical rhetoric form the essence of
casuistic reasoning, and contrast with the reasoning of the theorists. 1
59
Jonsen and Toulmin compare the role of a rhetorician with that of a lawyer/
advocate.' 60 A lawyer looks to develop a "theory of the case," searching among
all theories for the one that fits best the particular circumstances of the case before
her. The lawyer will develop arguments through logical reasoning (chains of
inferences and relationships between propositions, for instance) alongside those
that persuade, by convincing the audience that the story heard makes the most
sense under the circumstances. The lawyer is employing the tools of rhetoric, and
so, in the same way, is the casuist.
16
Jonsen and Toulmin contend that the role of rhetoric within casuistry is
inextricably connected to the reasoning method that distinguishes casuistry from
other forms of "applied ethics." 162 The conventional reasoning rejected by the
casuists assumes a capacity to resolve questions with some degree of finality, in
"geometrical" fashion. 1 63 Rhetoric, the lawyer's art, works amidst uncertainty
and ambiguity. It marshals the best arguments not merely to persuade (perhaps
the cynical perception of the lawyer's use of rhetoric), but also to make the most
sense of the ambiguity "all things considered," ' 64 and to achieve a form of
coherence for that particular moment. 165 The rhetorician understands that today's
case might be resolved differently from yesterday's, and can explain the differ-
ences in relevant circumstances to justify the distinction.
Jonsen and Toulmin, among others,166 identify several features of classical
rhetoric that are central to casuistry. A full rehearsal of the casuists' elaborate
158. See, e.g., JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 72-73 (discussing Aristotelian rhetoric).
159. Mark Kuczewski views casuistry's reliance on rhetoric as a mixed blessing:
This rhetorical character is, at once, the strength and weakness of casuistry. It is a strength because it
keeps the discussion close to common sense and to premises whose warrants are derived from
experience. It is a weakness because casuistry must constantly face the challenge that it may
degenerate into mere sophistry or become an apology for the status quo.
KuczEwsru, supra note 13, at 68.
160. JONSEN & TOuN, supra note 12, at 297-98.
161. For the argument that the practice of law is a form of the practice of rhetoric, see James Boyd White,
Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Ct. L. REV. 684 (1985).
White's rhetoric is not the ignoble version alluded to just above, but "the central art by which community and
culture are established, maintained, and transformed. So regarded, rhetoric is continuous with law, and like it,
has justice as its ultimate subject." Id. at 684.
162. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 295-96.
163. Id. at 293-96. See also supra notes 51-63, 144, and accompanying text (discussing principlism and
geometric approach).
164. This phrase is employed by Heidi Li Feldman in her defense of virtue ethics. See Feldman, supra note
79, at 910, 924, 941.
165. See White, supra note 68, at 546 (suggesting that particularized cultural forms of communication would
inform and educate a tribunal of the cause at issue).
166. See James M. Tallmon, How Jonsen Really Views Casuistry: A Note on the Abuse of Father Wildes, 19 J.
MEO. & PHIL. 103, 104-10 (1994) (discussing what Tallmon calls "Jonsen on Rhetorical Reason in Casuistry")
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arguments is not necessary for our "plain person" lawyering purposes, but a brief
highlight of these might be instructive. First is the concept of topics ("topoi"). ,
67
Topoi, the plural form of topos ("place"), are the places where one looks "to
gather materials with which to construct arguments." 168 Aristotle distinguished
between two types of topoi, "common topics" and "special topics." 169 "Com-
mon topics," less important to casuistry, are the forms of argument that would
apply in any reasoning process (causality, analogy, proportion, etc.). "Special
topics," those which represent "the recurrent and invariant features that consti-
tute" 170 a particular activity, on the other hand, are central to casuistic reasoning.
In business, the special topics would be "investment, profit, productivity,
etc."; 17 1 in clinical medicine, the special topics could be medical indications,
patient preferences, quality of life, and social and economic context. 17 2 In law,
the special topics might include informed consent, conflicts of interest, access to
justice, and confidentiality.1 73 These topics will structure any discussion of ethics
in context and serve to begin the identification of paradigm cases and "maxims."
Maxims are the second concept derived from classical rhetoric.' 74 They serve
as the paradigmatic normative raw material for casuistry. Casuists replace
deduction with the employment of maxims - the rules of thumb, common
wisdoms, folk sayings, or self-evident "common morality" with which, at least
superficially, we all agree.1 75 Maxims are a staple of classical rhetoric. The
Roman rhetorician Boethius described maxims as:
[K]nown per se, in such a way that there cannot be anything more known by
which it could be proved. Since these propositions produce appropriate belief
[hereinafter Tollman, How Jonsen Really Views Casuistry]; James M. Tallmon, Casuistry and the Role of
Rhetorical Reason in Ethical Inquiry, 28 PHm. & RHETORlc 377 (1995).
167. James Tallmon writes that, "If clinical casuistry is inextricably bound to any matrix, it is that matrix derived
from the classical lore of rhetorical topics." Tallmon, How Jonsen Really Views Casuistry, supra note 166, at 105.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Jonsen, Alternative or Complement, supra note 15, at 242; Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology, supra
note 131, at 300.
171. Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology, supra note 131, at 300.
172. These four topics have been chosen by JONSEN Er AL., supra note 10, at 5-7.
173. Jonsen has described the special topics as "are often found as the chapter headings of basic textbooks."
Jonsen, Alternative or Complement, supra note 15, at 242. The role of special topics in rhetoric is to orient the
forthcoming discussion. They have "an invaiant structure and variable content." Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology,
supra note 131, at 300. The "invariant structure" but "variable content" concept is best expressed by Tallmon's
metaphor of a cookbook. All culinary art includes the following special topics: combination of ingredients; temperature;
handling; and measurements. Those are "invariant structures" to cooking. In every case of performing the art of
cooking, one will visit these special topics, even though the actual recipes will vary considerably in content. See
Tallmon, How Jonsen Really Views Casuistry, supra note 166, at 110. Each topic possesses an "inner logic," id.
at 106, which implies subtopics, which a case analyst will parse in order to reveal the issue at hand.
174. The use of maxims is derived from Aristotle's notion of "enthymemes," arguments which are
presumptively correct based upon our common understanding. JONSEN & ToULMIN, supra note 12, at 73.
175. Id, at 252-53; Jonsen, On Being a Casuist, supra note 15, at 121-22; Tallmon, How Jonsen Really
Views Casuistry, supra note 166, at 108-09.
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in themselves by nature, they not only need no argument from without for
belief but also are generally the starting point for the proof of other things. 
76
Maxims are exemplified by paradigm cases. In law, some maxims might include,
"you always follow your client's instructions"; "lawyers do not turn away
clients without good reason"; "it is wrong to reveal a client's information"; "it is
wrong to lie to another lawyer"; and "a lawyer should first advance her client's
case." Each of these would be arguments relied upon by any good lawyer in
debating an important issue. Each may, and indeed will, have exceptions arising
from certain combinations of circumstances, and that is understood. The role for
the case analyst is to embrace the maxims in such a way as to make the most
sense of the case before her.177 Her arguments will not necessarily be long,
complex chains of reasoning, but instead will be more abbreviated evocation of
the maxims, in what classical rhetoricians called "enthymemes." 
1 78
The next rhetorical device employed by casuists is that of "taxonomies." Any
morally complex case will invoke one or more of the field's special topics. Those
topics will help frame the issue at stake in the case, and that issue should suggest
several maxims. If a maxim applies, then the line of inquiry ends. In most
interesting cases, a maxim will not easily apply without dissonance. That being
176. ANictus MANLIUS SEVERINUS BoETHIus, DE ToPIcis DIFFERENTiS 1176D 33 (Eleonore Stump ed. 1978),
quoted in Tallmon, How Jonsen Really Views Casuistry, supra note 166, at 107. Jonsen makes the same
argument:
It is important to note that casuists never attempt to systematize maxims: they do not use them as
axioms to construct an argument; they do not marshal them into lexical orderings; they do not even
worry much about "justifying them." They simply invoke them, much as ordinary folk do in arguing
moral matters. Their primary concern is whether this maxim "fits" these circumstances.
Jonsen, On Being a Casuist, supra note 15, at 122.
177. Tallmon suggests a further role for maxims: They "help guide the inquiry by alerting those involved
that the line from specificity to abstractness is about to be crossed." Tallmon, How Jonsen Really Views
Casuistry, supra note 166, at 108. A critique or deconstruction of a maxim signifies a leaving of the practical
realm for the contemplative realm, and that risks unproductive digression. "The professional colloquium, not
the clinical consult, is the more appropriate place for contemplation of ethical principles." Id.
178. Jonsen, Alternative or Complement, supra note 15, at 244. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARv. L. REV. 923, 983
(1996) (defining "enthymeme" as "[a] term to refer to any argument - valid or invalid, deductive or
nondeductive - the logical form of which is not perspicuous from its original manner of presentation. Judicial
opinions and other legal arguments are usually enthymematic in this sense"); Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric
of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think about Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HAsTINGs
L.J. 61, 165 (1995) ("[Tjhe logical arguments attorneys make to jurors may be understood in terms of the
classical rhetorical model of the enthymeme."); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the
Bright Line Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 814 (1995) (offering enthymeme as a form of
persuasive argument of lawyers and judicial opinions).
Ronald Mckinney agrees that casuistry relies on ethymemes as rhetorical devices, and contrasts that form of
argument with a story-telling method more common within narrative ethics. Mckinney describes "the
'judgments of rationality' characteristic of casuistry with the 'judgments of affectivity,' which are proper to the
more 'existential,' narrative approach to moral reasoning." Mckinney, supra note 13, at 337 (quoting William C.
Spohn, The Reasoning Heart: An American Approach to Christian Discernment, in INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN
ETHics: A READER 563, 564 (Ronald Hamel & Kenneth Himes eds., 1989)).
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so, the next rhetorical step, according to the casuists, is to identify a taxonomy of
cases, starting with paradigm cases on either side of the issue and continuing with
cases of lesser certainty. The case at issue is then fit within the array or continuum
of cases, and the case comparison process ensues.1
7 9
Classical rhetoric was always intended to persuade audiences on questions of
importance to the polity or the community. While that understanding of rhetoric
may be diminished today, it need not be lost. The affinity between law and
rhetoric, and that between casuistry and rhetoric, combined with the frequent
analogies within casuistry to the common law method, only emphasizes the
importance of connecting the practice of casuistry and the practice of legal ethics
in an explicit way.
VI. CASUISTRY IN ACTION
[lIt turns out that, like the bourgeois gentilhomme, we've all been "practicing
casuistry" all along...
John Arras
1 80
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE EXAMPLES
At this point in the analysis, we must respect casuistry's most fundamental
insight. The discussion thus far has consisted of ideas -intellectual ferment
about the relationship between abstract theory and the complex world of practice.
That discussion has shown the benefits of a deliberative method that respects
practice and doubts theory, but, tautologically perhaps, it has not yet included
practice elements. It is to that task that this Article now turns. In doing so, though,
we confront the paradox of scholarship in this realm: even the "practice"
elements that arrive here will not be practice at all, but will at best be
hypotheticals or glossed-over stories. Casuists remind us that hypotheticals fail to
179. Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology, supra note 131, at 301-02. Jonsen writes, "The taxonomy of cases
is crucially important in casuistry. It puts the instant case into its moral context and reveals the weight of
argument that might countervail a presumption of rightness or wrongness." Id.
180. John D. Arras, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, 20 HASTINGS CTR. RPRT. 35 (July
1990) (reviewing JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12). Arras refers to the frequently-quoted dialogue of Moliere:
Mr. Jourdain: I am in love with a lady of quality and I want you to help me write her a little note....
Philosopher: Certainly. You want it in verse no doubt?
Mr Jourdain: No. None of your verse for me.
Philosopher: You want it in prose then?
Mr Jourdain: No, I don't want it in either.
Philosopher: [But] my dear sir, if you want to express yourself at all there are only verse or prose for
it....
Mr. Jourdain: Talking, as I am now, which is that?
Philosopher: That is prose....
Mr. Jourdain: Here I've been talking prose for forty years and never known it, and mighty grateful I
am for you telling me!
MOL RE, THE WOULD-BE GENTLEMAN (1670), quoted in Miles, supra note 107, at 961.
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achieve the splendor (or, perhaps more often, the imperfections) of real cases.
The clinic or law firm cases cannot be captured within the classroom, and certainly not
in an article to be read for the classroom. 18' This tension is indeed inevitable, and
irresolvable, for writing and reading is what we do. So, hypotheticals it will be.
To model the casuist method, I choose to revisit two of the examples discussed
and explored in Susan Kupfer's important article proposing a model of "commu-
nicative ethics." 182 Using these examples provides certain benefits. Her stories
are real ones arising from her clinical practice. She has publicly discussed them,
both from her students' perspective as well as from the perspective of her ethical
model. And, I happen to think that her resolution is different from what might
occur using the casuistry approach. As I review each case, I shall note not just the
casuist perspective, but I shall also compare the other "competing" methods as
181. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 5 (espousing the advantages of clinic work for teaching
professional values). Cf. Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, I CLINICAL L. REv. 93
(1994) (contending that clinical education is essentially skills training, and that most scholarship known to be
"clinical" has less relevance to that goal).
182. Kupfer, supra note 16. Kupfer undertakes to craft a workable ethic for lawyers based upon postmodern
thought, and in this effort she highlights important resemblances with casuistry but also some significant
differences. kupfer emphasizes the postmodem privileging of discourse as an element of a coherent "discursive
practice." Id. at 63-64. Relying on the continental theories of Jirgen Habermas and Hans-George Gadamer she
proposes a form of "[clommunicative ethics, or discourse ethics," which she argues can constitute a "rational
procedure for establishment of values through intersubjective practice." Id. at 86-87 (citing JUrgen Habermas,
Morality in Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 195 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans. 1990); JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AcT-ION (Thomas McCarthy trans. 1984); HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1993)). Kupfer describes the
discourse ethics as follows:
The salient characteristic of communicative ethics is intersubjectivity. It is a relation that affects both
the identity of the individual and the collective sense of the community. Values are determined by
rigorous debate according to strict procedures that aim to involve all concerned persons. The goal is
communicative; agreement is sought among those participating. This differs from strategic action, in
which the participants seek the solution that will best maximize their own interests. Ethics is removed
from the realm of subjective individuality and moved into the realm of language and communication.
Kupfer, supra note 16, at 87-88 (citations omitted). At first glance, Kupfer's discourse ethics looks quite
different from casuistry. It is more centrally dialogic, does not employ the rhetorical conceptions of paradigm
cases or analogical reasoning, and seems to privilege the process of conversation over the quality of the
resulting choices. Viewed more carefully, however, Kupfer's proposal, if I read it right, shares quite a bit of
casuistry's sentiments and perhaps its process as well. Kupfer's device of dialogue accomplishes ethical
progress through the device of reason-giving. Id. at 90-91. "[R]easons (articulated rationales for behavior) are a
method of universalizing ethical judgment." Id. at 91. 1 suspect that Kupfer's reasons are casuistry's maxims,
the shared conceptions from which ethical concord might ensue. And, while discourse ethics is wholly
intersubjective (where the casuists imply individual reasoning), Kupfer reminds us of the insight of Christine
Korsgaard, who "argues that reasons presume a relationship, which implies the existence of another person;
normative claims can thus only be imposed on others if we would impose them on ourselves." Id. at 98 n.240
(citing Christine M. Korsgaard, The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-
Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, in ALTRUISM 24, 51 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993)). Compare RAWLS,
supra note 48, at 580 ("[Jlustification is argument addressed to those who disagree with us, or to ourselves
when we are of two minds.").
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well. After my discussion of the Kupfer examples, I briefly return to our earlier
story of Mark and his dilemma about "welfare fraud." 1
83
B. THE FIRST EXAMPLE: "THE ZEALOUS ADVOCATE" 
184
1. The Case
In this case, a student attorney represented a nineteen year-old man in his claim
for unemployment insurance benefits after the client was discharged from his
work. The client's employer objected to his collecting benefits because, it alleged, the
man's conduct amounted to "intentional misconduct in willful disregard of the
employer's interest." ' 85 The employer bears the burden of proving that set of facts,
which includes the requisite state of mind for "willfulness."' 18 6 The student, in his
preparation for the appeal, had learned that the man was mentally retarded and,
with his client's consent, had obtained school records evidencing borderline I.Q.
The client, however, refused to permit the student to argue a theory that would
characterize him as retarded or disabled. To overcome this resistance, the student
arranged to have the client "called out of the room during the hearing," ' 87 at
which time the student presented his evidence and arguments on the mental
impairment theory.188 The client was awarded unemployment benefits by the
hearing officer, who apparently cited to the evidence in the favorable decision.'189
After the case was completed, the student defended his choice, in class, by
characterizing it as one "raising strategic considerations," presumably placing it
within the realm of the lawyer's discretion and not a choice- requiring client
consent.' 90 If the student is right about the scope of obligation, then this choice
qualifies as a discretionary ethics matter.
183. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (presenting the "Mark" story).
184. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 48.
185. While each state develops its own standards and procedures for processing unemployment compensa-
tion claims, the intentional or gross misconduct standard is the basic requirement of the overarching federal
unemployment scheme. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 615.8 (1998) (discussing extended benefits payable through
unemployment compensation programs).
186. See, e.g., Still v. Commissioner of Employment & Training, 672 N.E.2d 105 (1996) (clhifying that
"knowing" implies intent for purposes of statute disqualifying employees from receiving unemployment
benefits).
187. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 48.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The conclusion that permission from the client was not mandatory seems warranted under the
standards established by bar authorities. Indeed, but for defining the objectives of the representation, and
deciding on settlements and pleas, virtually no lawyering decisions include veto power for clients. See, e.g.,
MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation.... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."). Whether
the decision in the case at hand constitutes an "objective" is arguable, although most formal authorities would
viev the matter, like the student did, as "means" and not "ends." Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)
(holding that an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to direct his lawyer's choice of arguments);
American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of Professional
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Kupfer's treatment of this case first shows the student's rather lame defense of
his actions.' 9 ' Later in her article, she defends a more compassionate stance by
the application of the discursive ethics method. 192 Kupfer's response to this story
is far more thoughtful, sensitive, and correct than is the student's response. It is
not at all apparent, however, that the improvement results from following the
discursive method. 193 I hope to show that the more comfortable resolution
Kupfer demonstrates is more aptly compatible with a casuist vision and method
than with the method she espouses.
Following the discursive method, Kupfer suggests a reciprocal "dialogue
within the community" between the client and the lawyer about the moral
conflict. That dialogue, though, only contemplates the student changing his mind
based upon his learned understanding of the perspective of "the Other." The
proposed method does not allow for the possibility that the client would change
his position. And, if the two members of the dialogic community cannot reach
consensus, Kupfer concludes that the lawyer must follow the client's moral
direction as a professional obligation. 
194
Kupfer is right in her assessment of who should "give" here, but that sense of
Conduct 34 (2d ed. 1996) ("In civil matters the lawyer's decision on tactics or means of achieving the client's
objectives may be accorded more deference .... ). Few commentators agree with the wisdom of that sentiment,
however. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979) (arguing for a more textured view of the ends/means distinction); Dinerstein, Reappraisal,
supra note 59 (advocating a more client-centered attorney-client relationship).
191. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 48 ("[While] [t]he cost to client autonomy was quite high," the matter was a
strategic one, and .'I would make the same choice.., again.' The ethical implications of the conduct were not
otherwise discussed.").
192. Id. at 102-04.
193. Kupfer first suggests, consistent with the communicative ethics model she develops in her article, a
Habermasian "dialogue within the community." Id. at 103. That community, in this case, consists of the client
and the student. The proposed dialogue involves the important notion of reciprocity, where each party learns to
view the world from the perspective of the "Other." Id. What becomes clear, though, is that the perspective of
the client is privileged over that of the student. Her description of the interaction makes very plain the hope that
the student will learn why he is wrong. If the parties remain at a standstill (that the client might change his mind
based upon this dialogue is unmentioned), then "the lawyer must agree with the client's moral position and
figure out a way to work within its boundaries." Id. at 104 (emphasis added). Kupfer then implies that this result
is required in any event, so that even if the student remains unconvinced on moral grounds, his legal obligation
trumps any moral considerations ("[T]he lawyer must acknowledge that the client's position.., is the one the
lawyer must execute under the Model Code and the Model Rules"). Id. (emphasis added).
If Kupfer is correct in her last sentiment, then this case would not qualify as a discretionary ethics matter at
all, and the only remaining moral choice for her student is whether he wishes to proceed as a "moral activist,"
and disregard the obligatory professional standard. That choice is not addressed, largely (I suspect) because the
student's choice appears so apparently wrong. As I describe below, though, it is not wrong because of the
privilege of client interests and perspectives over those of the student. Indeed, Kupfer, earlier in her article,
seemed to agree. She argued elegantly that "In considering the relative autonomy of lawyers and their clients,
there needs to be more emphasis on the autonomy of the attorney." Id. at 40 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 76
("To overcome this tendency [of students to abandon their initial resistance to group norms when entering a
profession] likely to be present in law students, law schools need to emphasize autonomy as an essential
component of ethical decisionmaking.").
194. Id. at 104.
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"rightness" precedes the dialogue rather than follows from or is produced by it.
There is a moral sensibility that attaches to this case that Kupfer plainly shares,
and that sensibility informs her suggestions about how the case should be
discussed. Her example, for that reason, is a very nice one to use to explore the
way that the applied ethics models, including casuistry, could respond to the
tensions presented in it. 1
95
2. The Deductivists' Approach
The unemployment case exhibits moral conflict because it contains elements
of at least two competing values. The first is beneficence, or the desire to "do
good"; the second is autonomy, or the right to control one's own life. The right of
the client to choose his own fate conflicts with the desire on the lawyer's part to
accomplish the action that increases the benefits for the client. At the level of
moral theory, we can compare how a deontologist and a utilitarian might respond
to that tension.
a. The Deontologist
This case might seem a very easy call for a Kantian, "obligation-based" 
196
theorist. Recall that a deontological perspective holds that "some features of
actions other than or in addition to consequences make actions right or wrong." 
197
That view honors Kant's categorical imperative: "I ought never to act except in
such a way that I can also will that my maxim become a universal law." 1 98 Since
the student's urge to manipulate the case to win benefits follows from the
perceived good consequences of doing so, notwithstanding the dignity cost to his
client, a Kantian presumably would not allow that consequence to drive the
choice. In addition, since Kantian theory elevates respect for the dignity of each
human being as a rational creature, 99 it follows that such a stance would invite
the "rights-based" conclusion that the teenager's choice, regardless of its
wisdom, ought to be respected.
However, this answer may not end the matter just yet. If the consequentialist
concerns are defined away by the Kantian, the student ought to wonder why the
client's privacy rights trump the student's obligation to win the case, or even the
client's obligation to support himself. Beauchamp and Childress point out that
Kant -was not a defender of autonomy in the way we understand it today; Kant,
they tell us, distinguished between "moral autonomy," by which a person
195. Some might see this example as too "easy," as I suspect that most readers will share Kupfer's intuitive
reaction that her student was wrong. As I describe soon, this perception follows from certain factual
assumptions about the case. If the context of the case were a bit different, it could readily seem less clear-cut.
196. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS. PRINCIPLES IV. supra note 10, at 56.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 57.
199. DONAGAN, supra note 36, at 63-66.
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"knowingly acts in accordance with the universally valid moral principles that
pass the requirements of the categorical imperative, ' ' 200 and "heteronomy,"
which represents "any controlling influence over the will other than motivation
by moral principles," including "passion, ambition, or self-interest. ' '"0 ' To
proceed as a deontologist, the student must ascertain that the client's decision to
forego unemployment benefits was motivated by moral concerns and not by the
"passion" of his embarrassment about his low I.Q.202
To the philosophers, this assessment might appear hopelessly na've. Most
sophisticated deontological thinking would most likely easily find that the man's
right to privacy and his right to autonomy trump whatever other concerns the
student might have for the man's self-interest (and, even more easily, the
student's desire to win his case).2 ° 3 The point is that the theory of deontology,
standing alone, does not self-evidently lead to a solution even in the not-terribly-
controversial example at hand. We hold for the moment the question of whether
deontological rules or principles (in contrast to theory) would serve as more
reliable guidance in a case like this.
b. The Consequentialist
We have seen how the unemployment case does not lend itself to an apparent
resolution under deontological theory, although it may well be a simple case for a
sophisticated deontologist. The question seems even more muddled for the
consequentialists. Consider "rule-utilitarianism," the most defended version of
consequentialism. 2°4 That theory would have the student adopt that rule or set of
rules "the implementation of which would maximize utility," 20 5 such that "[h]e
ought always to produce the maximal balance of positive value over dis-
value." 206 If he acted as a utilitarian in the unemployment case, would that theory
suggest to him a way to proceed?
The answer has to be that we do not know, and perhaps cannot know. As
Carson Strong argues, we need data to support the assumptions which would
underlie our actions within this model. 20 7 Is utility maximized by respecting the
privacy rights of this client? To answer that question we would need information
200. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 58.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 68 (noting an evolving view of "autonomy" in recent ethics literature).
203. See, e.g., DONAGAN, supra note 36, at 66 (arguing that a modem Kantian "philosophical core" within
the Hebrew-Christian tradition can be expressed in this rational principle: "It is impermissible not to respect
every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature"). Other prominent deontologists include Henry
Sidgwick and W. D. Ross. See FRANKENA, supra note 33, at 17 (discussing rule-based deontology).
204. See Strong, supra note 69, at 194 (commenting that rule utilitarianism is "a normative theory whose
defense receives as much attention as any these days").
205. Id.
206. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 47.
207. Strong, supra note 69, at 196.
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about his level of unhappiness derived from the manipulation and resulting
characterization of his mental qualities, and the length of time of that discomfort,
versus the happiness the client would achieve by having the money he otherwise
would lose by protecting his privacy. "IFlor each policy a rule-utilitarian might
defend, there would be a similar assumption concerning a balancing of harms.
However, sociological data are not available to support these various assump-
tions." 2
08
It seems plain that it would be very difficult for the law student to perform the
calculations necessary to implement a utilitarian assessment in this case. The
theory, as such, does not aid the practitioner very well. That ineffectiveness in
practice is the first objection to reliance on this theory as a deliberative method. A
second objection to such use is that utilitarianism might justify the student's
actions in this case, but we know (as Kupfer describes the case) that what the
student did was wrong. Utilitarianism, as a theory, would then conflict with our
considered moral judgments.
c. The Principlist
Most ethicists, as noted above, no longer suggest broad or abstract conceptions
of moral theory, like utilitarianism or Kantianism, to guide a law student in a case
like this, instead proposing mid-level principles. Here, the applicable principles
would be beneficence and autonomy. The first would constitute a prima facie
obligation20 9 on the part of the law student to maximize the interests of his client,
which ordinarily would mean to assist him to win his case.2 '0 The second would
counsel the student, again as a prima facie duty, to respect the instructions of the
client, to permit the teenager to control his own affairs even at some risk of harm
to his interests.2'
208. Id.
209. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES IV, supra note 10, at 104-06 (construing "principles as
prima facie binding" in a discussion of the nature of principles); Ross, supra note 3, at 20 (defending prima
facie duty analysis).
210. See Edward J. Eberle, Three Foundations of Legal Ethics: Autonomy, Community, and Morality, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1993) (furthering client interests as a moral commitment of lawyering); Ellmann,
Lawyering for Justice, supra note 55, at 131-41 (defending the commitment of zealous advocacy against David
Luban's moral critique). The defense of zeal and commitment to client interests seldom includes a defense of
paternalistic zeal against client instructions. Only in cases of disabled or young clients does one confront the
argument that the best interests of the client might override the choices of the client. See note 211 infra.
211. Most of the literature regarding children as clients privileges the child's choice over her perceived best
interests when the child is capable of independent judgment. See, e.g., Linda L. Long, When the Client Is a
Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21 J. FAM. L. 607 (1982-83); Symposium, Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 4 (1996) (discussing the need for children's lawyers to permit
children who are clients to direct the course of their own representation when the children are capable of doing
so). Cf David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 454 (extending paternalistic
role of attorney to representation involving ordinary, capable adults); Monroe Freedman, Personal Responsibil-
ity in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 204 (1978) ("[An] attorney acts both professionally and
morally in assisting clients to maximize their autonomy, . .. [but] the attorney acts unprofessionally and
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The two principles conflict: the law student believed that the beneficence
principle ought to take priority, while his supervisor believed that the autonomy
principle should carry greater weight. Our sensibility is that she is right and he is
wrong, but the principlist doctrine does not tell us why that is so. It might be that
the principlist doctrine, if pressed, would concede that autonomy trumps benefi-
cence in a "lexical ordering" kind of way.212 But, before we easily so conclude
that autonomy deserves such a trumping privilege, consider a variation of the
unemployment case:
This time, the client is not a teenager but the father of four young children,
ranging in age from one to six. His wife is disabled by chronic arthritis and
receives Social Security disability benefits. The client has been the primary
support for this family. Once he lost his job his family has suffered considerable
economic stress. Despite the great need for money, he, like the 19-year-old,
refuses to permit a strategy that exploits, for purposes of the administrative
hearing, his limited intellectual abilities.
At worst, this variation nudges us to rethink our visceral commitment to client
autonomy; at best, it reverses our reactions to the student's strategy conclu-
sions.21 3 The presence of potential harm to others, and of an apparent choice by
this man to place his pride over the physical well-being of his children, pushes us
to apply different principles in this case. And we would be right in doing so. That
is the insight of the casuist.
3. A Casuistry Approach
The casuist's approach to the unemployment case would look different from
immorally by depriving clients of their autonomy,. . . by... preempting their moral decisions, or by depriving
them of the ability to carry out their lawful decisions.").
212. In bioethics as well as in law, the value of autonomy carries far greater weight than does that of
beneficence. See KucZawsKi, supra note 13, at 77-78 (discussing autonomy in bioethics and law); JONSEN ET
AL., supra note 10, at 37-38 (discussing autonomy in bioethics); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of
Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U.
Miami L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1994)(arguing that lawyers must act in the interests of clients, and that "[t]he Dark
Secret of Progressive Lawyering is that effective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own
values and influencing their clients to adopt those judgments."). For an examination of recent critical scrutiny of
this preference, see, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOvERIsHMENT OF POLmCAL DISCOURSE
(1991).
213. The idea that autonomy ought to be respected regardless of the implications for a client's or a patient's
relevant community has less currency than it might have had in the past. The communitarian critique of that
classically liberal conception has influenced much recent scholarship. See, e.g., Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with
Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What's an Attorney To Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency
Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1994); Tremblay, Practiced MoralActivism, supra note 153 (criticizing
competence as the sole criterion against which to measure decisions to interfere with a client's individual
choices). But see Gear, supra note 25 (criticizing the. recent trend to downplay the interest in client autonomy).
Note that with the revised fact setting we still might quibble with the way the student accomplished his
"beneficent" goal, having employed deception and manipulation as he did, but even then, if that method was the
only way to accomplish the morally preferable goal, our quibbles might be calmed.
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the deductivist's approach.2" 4 She will not search for a theory or a principle, or a
lexical ordering of principles, to decide how to proceed, or to evaluate the law
student's choice to proceed as he did. She will instead rely on the principles
available as orienting points, develop paradigm cases from those principles,
consider carefully the relevant moral factors present in the paradigm cases, and
then explore the specifics of those factors in the case at hand. Then using
analogical reasoning and the practice of "moral triangulation," she will assess
whether the case at hand better resembles one paradigmatic case or another. She
will then make her best judgment of that conclusion, all things considered,
understanding that she has at best probable certitude for her choices.21 5 Carson
Strong calls this the "case comparison" method. 1 6
Two principles apply in this case, as noted: beneficence and autonomy. Each
principle can be stated as a "maxim": "Advance your client's legal interests"
and "Follow your client's wishes." Carson Strong suggests first that, where it is
apparent that more than one principle has moral applicability, we identify clear
cases representing each principle. 2 7 Note that for this process to unfold, the
practitioner must acknowledge each competing consideration. A law student who
only saw the beneficence factor here could not use the "case comparison"
method, of course, but such a student would not perceive ethical conflict at all
(and would thus have no use for any of the methods we have explored). Any
deliberative method, then, will call for some minimal ability to recognize ethical
tension in practice.
Here, Kupfer's student does recognize the tension between the principles. He
reported to his Professional Responsibility class that "[t]he cost to client
autonomy was quite high.",2 1 8 The student obviously saw the costs as worth the
candle, though, given how he proceeded. The fact that his actions also implicate a
possible conflict of interest - his need to be a successful lawyer with a "win" on
214. For a helpful dialogue consisting of an attempted casuistic treatment of a clinical case and then a
critique of that effort claiming that it is inadequately casuistic, see Martin L. Smith & Kevin P. Martin,
Confidentiality in the Age of AIDS: A Case Study in Clinical Ethics, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHics 236 (1993); Athena
Beldecos & Robert M. Arnold, Gathering Information and Casuistic Analysis, 4 J. CLINIcAL ETHics 241 (1993).
For a book-length treatment of the practice of casuistry in a medical clinical setting, see JONSEN Er AL., supra
note 10.
215. The casuist method just described does not preclude, by any means, the dialogic process suggested by
Kupfer in her proposed discursive method. See Kupfer, supra note 16, at 90-93 (considering how individual
ethics could be justified when individuals disagree as to appropriate outcomes). The reciprocal dialogue
modeled within discursive ethics can be of considerable help in identifying the details of the case, including the
interests at stake and the desires of the client (as well as the motivations of the lawyer). But it also seems true
that such dialogue is not an essential feature of the casuistic method. It is distinct from, but fully compatible
with, a "discourse ethics" approach.
216. Strong, supra note 69, at 201-03. Strong's process has been praised by Albert Jonsen, whose process for
casuistry developed in The Abuse of Casuistry shares much of what I have described here, in Jonsen, Practice
Versus Theory, supra note 106, at 33; JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12. at 306-07.
217. Strong, supra note 69, at 202. See also JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 252 (noting movement
toward complex cases for analytical purposes).
218. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 48.
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his record might affect his decisionmaking - means that he will need to include a
third principle, that of loyalty.219 That principle ought also to be represented by a
paradigm case, as well as a maxim - say, "Never let your interests interfere with
your duty to your client."
The casuist would need to call upon paradigm cases to stand for each of the
conflicting principles that come to bear on this dispute. Because casuistry is not
yet an established practice within legal ethics, these cases are not yet part of the
lore or "stock stories ' 220 of the profession, at least not explicitly. Such a
collection of precedential stock stories would arise from the "special topics"
within law practice, 2 I and can, in time, be represented by maxims. 22 Legal
ethicists have not yet mastered this method as well as bioethicists have. For
present purposes, though, we can imagine the cases and maxims, as well as the
special topics identified earlier. 23
A paradigm case for the autonomy principle ought to be reasonably accessible
to the casuist. The principle stands for the proposition that a person's choices
about his life ought to be respected. His conception of what is good is one of the
choices deserving of respect. A client who chooses to settle a case for emotional
satisfaction, closure, avoidance of litigation, and a small amount of money rather
than to proceed to trial for a chance to win more money at greater emotional risk
represents a clear, evocative paradigm case that captures the principle of
autonomy.224 A casuist could work with the law student to have him identify
cases where the principle he accepts would be exemplified.
Cases capturing beneficence might be harder to locate, especially those that are
not trite. The reason for this is that the value of autonomy is so privileged within
American moral philosophy, and certainly within law.2 5 Beneficence is certainly
a value, no doubt, and easily represented by everyday cases in which the lawyer's
obligation is to act zealously. For the stock story to have weight as a paradigm
case, though, it ought to serve as a clear case in which beneficence trumps other
competing interests.2 26
219. The "principle" of loyalty is, of course, a long-standing and fully accepted one within legal ethics. See
Eberle, supra note 210, at 99-103 (describing autonomy as an ethical foundation).
220. See Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984) (developing the role of "stock stories"
in lawyering practice).
221. See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text (discussing "special topics").
222. Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology, supra note 131, at 298; see also supra notes 174-78 and
accompanying text (discussing maxims).
223. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (discussing same).
224. The fact that this principle also happens to be "the law" through, e.g., MODEL RULEs Rule 1.2(a), or
agency doctrine, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 33 (1958) (stating the general principle that agents
are bound by the authority of their principal) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 31
(Am. L. Inst. Tent. Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996) (outlining the lawyer's duty to inform and consult with client), is
not dispositive of its status as a paradigm case, but neither does its obligatory nature forfeit its moral appeal as
an "easy" case.
225. See supra notes 193, 200-03, and 212 and accompanying text (discussing value of autonomy).
226. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 69, at 201-07 (using medical ethics cases in which intervention against the
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Two such "beneficence" cases come to mind. One is the case of the disabled
client. 227 We could construct a paradigm case in which a lawyer opts not to
follow the express choices of a client because it is very apparent that the client is
not able to understand the available choices and it is equally clear that the client
would, if competent, choose the option that maximizes her interests.22 8 The
second case would be a variation on the present case, where the interest of the
client to be protected is less central and the harm to the client, and to his
immediate family, is patent and direct. We could achieve consensus on these
stories, that in these cases it would be morally appropriate to act against what
otherwise would be autonomy interests.
The casuist would then, following Carson Strong's model, proceed to identify
the morally relevant ways in which the cases of the type in question can differ
from one another.2 2 9 This step is not hard in our case. The "autonomy" stock
stories differ from the "beneficence" stories in these morally relevant ways: the
paradigm case for autonomy reflects clear understanding by the client of the
risks, and/or no egregious harm to the client or to others. 230 The case for
beneficence reflects either no clear choice by the client or such grave harm to
those around him, or to himself, that respecting his choice, even if freely adopted,
is unacceptable.
The next step consists of moral triangulation, the comparison between the case
at hand and the two or more paradigm cases, looking at the morally relevant
factors just identified and the very specific details of the case at hand. This step
should immediately reveal why Kupfer seems right and her student wrong as she
describes the case to us. I read the story as one where the nineteen year-old will
not suffer grave harm by losing his unemployment case. I see no family, no minor
children, and no other factors that might alter the resemblance of this case to the
autonomy stock story. He appears to understand the choice before him, and the
injury to his dignity seems plausible. If we add in the two other factors I have not
wishes of a patient is clearly justified by the harm caused to immediate family members by a decision to respect
the patient's choice of non-treatment). Of course, if no such stock stories or paradigm cases could be found, then
the matter in question cannot claim the status of a principle. In other words, if no paradigm case can be found in
which a lawyer is easily justified to disrespect his client's express wishes for the client's, or the client's relevant
community's, best interests, then cases like the present one have no moral conflict. The presence of moral
conflict by hypothesis implies competing paradigm cases.
227. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1429, 1435 n.21 (1994) (reporting that all members of a conference working group would act without express
authority if needed to avoid irreparable harm in a case where the affected person ostensibly was disabled).
228. MODEL RULEs Rule 1.14 Comment [2] represents this principle, permitting a lawyer to act as "de facto
guardian" when necessary to protect a client's interests. For consideration of the limits of a lawyer's discretion,
see supra note 190.
229. Strong, supra note 69, at 202-03.
230. 1 concede that this last element may not be part of a paradigm case. I include it because it may represent
a paradigm case in some form. This exercise demonstrates the Jonsen and Toulmin argument of the need for the
profession to collect and refine the paradigm cases. See Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology, supra note 131, at
301-03 (discussing taxonomic organization of cases).
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explored - the student's deceptive manipulation of the client and his possible
conflict of interest - and quickly imagine the paradigm cases for each of these
principles, the case becomes even clearer.
Yet, there are two important insights from the casuists embedded in this
assessment. The first is that the details count for a lot. We have not developed a
"rule" that holds that clients always deserve respect in settings like this
unemployment case. Make this man forty-five, give him sick, young children and
a disabled wife, and the result is not necessarily the same. The second point is that
the conversation with the client, so central to the discursive method, does not end
matters in the casuist world. Kupfer employs the dialogue to nudge her student to
respect his client more,231 and that is a laudable goal. But the casuists will warn
that, even after such reciprocal conversation, this student may have to do the
same thing as he did before. It all depends on the results of the conversation and
the specific circumstances of the case.
C. THE SECOND EXAMPLE: "THE PROCEDURALIST"
232
In much briefer fashion, I now attempt a similar casuist assessment of a second
of Professor Kupfer's cases. In this case, a law student faces a tactical choice to
use a court process instrumentally or substantively.2 33 The student represents an
elderly couple in an eviction proceeding. The pro se landlord filed a complaint in
court too soon under prevailing law. If the student were to object to the misfiling
quickly, the case could be refiled by the landlord, and then heard on the merits. If
the student deliberately delayed his objection, the landlord would lose his right to
sue once the present case was dismissed for its procedural impropriety. The
student's clients would then win, but not on the merits. The student perceived this
to be a true dilemma.234
As with the "zealous advocate," Kupfer returns to this case to assess the moral
implications within discursive ethics.2 35 My purpose here is not to critique that
model's response as such,23 6 but instead to visit the case as would a casuist.
231. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing Kupfer's dialogue method).
232. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 49.
233. The choice Kupfer describes fits nicely the distinctions developed by William Simon in his essay on
ethical discretion. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 60, at 1096-1113 (discussing the tensions between
substance and procedure, purpose and form, and broad and narrow framing, as these tensions apply to
reconciling legal values related to the client's desired ends).
234. This description paraphrases Kupfer's account. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 49.
235. Id. at 108-11.
• 236. Kupfer respects her student for his intuitive sense of injustice and unfairness. She sees the matter,
though, as one governed by the lawyer's professional role. Id. at 109 ("[t]he professional paradigm of loyalty
and zealous representation demands accommodation" by the student to the demands of the adversary system).
That observation implies that the matter is not one of discretionary ethics, since the role obligations command a
certain outcome. Kupfer does not rest with that conclusion, however, suggesting at the same time that the matter
ought to be resolved through the discursive ethics method.
The case then turns out to have curious implications for that method. Kupfer suggests three "dialogic
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Kupfer implies that there are no conflicting principles here,2 37 but I think that
view misunderstands her description of her student's angst and the level of moral
complexity in her story. There are, indeed, conflicting moral principles here, even
if observers might see the conflict as quite one-sided: the commitment to zealous
advocacy (a variation of the beneficence norm described above) 238 and a
commitment to fairness. The former is so well-established that it requires no
discussion. The latter, though, is gaining respectability.239 It even has its stock
stories. Think of Spaulding v. Zimmerman.2"4 The zealous advocacy principle,
usually immune to objections about unfairness, cedes in Spaulding to such
complaints when a child's life is at stake. As in this eviction case, the defendants
in Spaulding gained substantial benefits by complying with strict court proce-
dure. We condemn them for using the process in that way, despite con-
ventional role morality.24 1 Other paradigm cases might include Zabella v.
communities" in this case: the clients, the student's colleagues, and the adversary. The latter would serve as the .
most pointed moral community (the landlord is, after all, the one suffering the harm here that leads to the moral
discomfort), and that conversation would present the most morally charged of the available conversations. But
that conversation cannot take place. It is the deception of the landlord that leads to the technical "win" that
troubles the student. Any moral dialogue would spill the proverbial beans. Kupfer apparently realizes this irony;
she omits any discussion of the dialogue with that moral community.
Kupfer correctly predicts that dialogue with the first two communities will result in heavy criticism of the
student's concerns, but that hardly resolves the student's moral angst or the ethical issue creating that angst. As
with the unemployment case, Kupfer again concludes that the clients' views will trump the student's:
In this instance the lawyer, once the clients have expressed their opposition to his proposed course of
action, is not free to go forward with his plan. He must understand, given the constraints of his
representation, that he needs to accede to their wishes if they do not agree with him.
Id. While the precept of client-centeredness is no doubt a powerful one, this offer of a trump within the moral
dialogue mischaracterizes the moral issue at hand. Kupfer's view comes up short in two important ways. First, if
this is a matter covered by substantive obligatory standards, then what is the purpose of the moral dialogue? The
lawyer will know what he "must" do before any conversation takes place. See supra note 193 (discussing a
similar observation of the "Zealous Advocate"). And second, if there are moral issues here, what is the benefit
of a dialogue if the clients' will is entitled to such privilege? As I have written elsewhere:
At the risk of propounding the obvious, it is important to note that any moral lawyering stance will be
client-unfriendly, almost by definition. Any activist stance that we observe will have a premise that
asserts that lawyers may reject certain client-chosen means or goals as ethically inappropriate.
Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, supra note 153, at 31 (footnotes omitted). See also, Scott Burnham,
Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 105, 106 (1991) (noting that taking advantage "for the
client" is "a true ethical dilemma: not a conflict between good and evil but a conflict between two goods").
237. Kupfer, supra note 16, at 109 ("Through this dialogue, the substantive policies behind the lawyer's
rationale will be exposed; the underlying principles behind the clients' position will be expressed.").
238. See text accompanying supra note 54 (summarizing the four principles defended by Beauchamp and
Childress).
239. For the best articulation of the principle represented by this student's desire for procedural fairness, see
Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 60. See also a description of two "activist" models, those of David Luban
and William Simon, in Tremblay, Practiced MoralActivism, supra note 153, at 12-19.
240. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962) (setting aside a court-approved settlement on behalf
of a minor after the court discovered the defendant did not disclose its awareness of the plaintiff's life
threatening medical condition of which the plaintiff was not aware).
241. For criticism of the lawyering in Spaulding, see, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
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Pakel242 or the Valdez v. Alloway's Garage simulation.2 43 Cases like Spaulding,
Zabella, and Valdez find their way into professional responsibility texts because
they represent, or at least conjure up, paradigm cases in which winning by a
technicality offends our moral conceptions.2
The question for the lawyer in the eviction case, then, is to identify the morally
relevant differences between the two sets of paradigm cases and to use those
factors to analogize to the eviction case. Once again, we see that Kupfer's
judgment about the morally preferable choice is right, but it is important to
understand why she is right, and how dependent that sentiment is on the context
of the case. We can assume certain facts here - facts the law student would need
to know. What is the relevant harm to the landlord in this case? He is described as
a college professor, thus not too poor 245 and not too unsophisticated. What are his
remedies once this proceeding is dismissed with prejudice? Because this is a
setting requiring administrative proceedings to be held before any formal
eviction complaint may be brought,246 the landlord impliedly will get at least part
of the monthly rent during the period of delay (and maybe all, if this is not a
non-payment case). 2 4 7 We do not know the harm to the tenants, or the fairness of
the procedures which the tenants must endure in order to have their rights
adjudicated.248
All of these factors would need to be explored and understood for a proper
casuist assessment to occur. In many cases, the moral qualms presented by the
student in this eviction case would be determined to be entirely legitimate ones.
THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 115 (David Luban ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE
GOOD LAWYER]; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 5-10 (2d. ed. 1994);
HOWARD LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 25-26
(1992).
242. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957), discussed in Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 241, at 38, 46, 59; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 9-10;
LESNICK, supra note 241, at 26-27. In Zabella, the court held that the use of a procedural statute of limitations
defense to avoid payment of a just debt owed to a needy former friend was valid where there was no writing.
243. See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINCIAL INSTRUCTION
IN ADVOCACY 586-91 (1978) (outlining the Valdez scenario). This evocative story is also discussed in Simon,
Ethical Discretion, supra note 60, at 1098-99. In Valdez, a sloppy, overworked personal injury plaintiffs' lawyer
overlooks a favorable change in the law and settles a wrongful death case for a mere fraction of the case's worth.
The more polished and well-resourced insurance lawyer blithely exploits the plaintiffs' lawyer's incompetence.
244. This has been David Luban's fundamental assertion in his moral activism writing. E.g., Luban, The
Adversary System Excuse, supra note 241; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 24.
245. Perhaps I make too facile an assumption here. The important point, though, is that the landlord's income
might matter.
246. See Kupfer, supra note 16, at 49.
247. See Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, supra note 153, at 33-42, for a discussion of an eviction case
in which the tenants were withholding rent during the delay. In that case, without using an explicit casuist
analysis, I argued that the actions of the tenants raised serious moral concerns that law professors, in their work
with clinic students, ought to explore deeply.
248. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 60, at 1097-98 (stressing the significance of the reliability of
the available judicial or administrative processes).
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No simple principle 249 can decide when the fairness concerns will override the
obligations of advocacy. As we are wont to do implicitly, casuistry allows us to
build upon our intuitive judgments to make those kinds of calls in as rigorous a
fashion as this reality can permit. John Arras is right - "we've all been
'practicing casuistry' all along.",250 We just did not realize we were doing so.
D. A THIRD EXAMPLE: CASUISTRY AND WELFARE FRAUD
We return now to the example with which I introduced the idea of discretionary
ethics.25 In this case, Mark, the legal services lawyer, represents a woman who is
not eligible for a full welfare grant, but who needs the money to raise her family,
and, through Mark's instrumental and lawful tactics, can maintain all of her grant.
Mark experiences tension in this representation; he is not comfortable using
procedural tactics to obtain goods not covered by the applicable administrative
scheme.252 At the same time, his professional role obligation suggests that he
"win" his client's case, and the prospect of Edna lacking funds to feed her
children is an unpleasant one. Hence his dilemma. Because both acting and not
acting are legal, the law of lawyering does not help Mark here. 53
We saw earlier how unhelpful either moral theory or the prima facie principles
249. The influence of principlist thinking in modem ethical thought is a pesky one. We see it throughout
Kupfer's excellent article. Despite a commitment to the nuanced, contextual, antitheoretical ideas of the
postmodems, Kupfer in fact approaches each of her four cases with a decidedly principlist bent. In each case the
lawyer's professional role obligations are afforded great weight, as we saw in the discussion of the two cases in
the text. Compare Kupfer, supra note 16, at 36-37 (rejecting formalism in favor of pragmatic and postmodem
methodology "focusing on particularity and context"), with id. at 101-111 (resolving four student cases with
great deference to role obligations and client autonomy). The model of reasoning in which one employs an
external criterion and applies it to a set of facts to determine a conclusion is a steadfast vestige of classical liberal
thought, and its persistence even among sophisticated and critical thinkers is impressive.
250. Arras, supra note 180, at 35.
251. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (presenting the discretionary ethics scenario).
252. In this respect, Mark adheres to William Simon's conception of ethical discretion. Simon, Ethical
Discretion, supra note 60. It is my sense that most lawyers do not share, or at least do not act upon, Simon's
thesis. If that is true, those lawyers will encounter little ethical conflict in this case, unlike Mark. That
observation in itself appears to conflict with one of casuistry's central insights, the rejection of a fact/value split.
KuczEwsKi, supra note 13, at 100. It implies that Mark "has" values that other lawyers do not "have,"
indicating a priority of value over circumstance, which the casuists deny. Does this reflect a weakness of
casuistry?
The philosophers who counsel against a strong fact/value distinction do not see the Mark/other lawyers
disagreement as evidence of prior values. As the casuists point out, it is very unlikely that Mark and other
practicing lawyers believe different things about what is "good," or about the easy cases. If they disagree about
Simon's thesis of ethical discretion, it is more likely because they differ about predictions and about facts.
Rather than evidencing a flaw in casuistry, this digression demonstrates how the art assists individuals who
seem to have different values to discuss their disagreements in a reasoned, nondogmatic way. For an abbreviated
discussion of this point, see Paul R. Tremblay, Coherence and Incoherence in Values-Talk, 5 CLEIrICAL L. REV.
325 (1998).
253. For an explanation of the "legal" basis of Mark's declining to represent Edna and assist her to "win"
the welfare hearing, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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are to Mark's effort to sort out his ethical discomfort.25 4 Mark's resort to casuistry
does not promise any simple or formulaic solution, nor a universal one. But, like
Jonsen's museum metaphor,255 the casuists can offer an opportunity for some
reasoned consideration or discussion about Mark's plight. In fact, his deliberation
will resemble that of the preceding example, as it involves similar competing
considerations.
Mark's dilemma can be represented by two principles, or maxims, or paradigm
cases: (1) using sharp legal tactics to obtain benefits not intended by substantive
law is presumptively wrong; 256 and (2) failing to assist a mother to feed her
family by means of legal means is also presumptively wrong.257 Whether Mark
ought to violate the first or second of these turns not on questions of moral
preferences or some kind of lexical ordering, but rather on predictions about
facts. Will Edna's family suffer if Mark refuses to assist her in her deception? Is
her welfare grant truly a last resort? Is the legislative.or regulatory scheme a fair
one? Does the scheme intend to deny money to women like Edna, or are the rules
developed more for administrative or bureaucratic convenience or efficiency? 258
Sometimes, then, Mark ought to assist his client, despite his commitment not
to use law instrumentally. 259 At other times, Mark ought to refuse to do so. Mark
will arrive at a decision in any given circumstance in much the same way that a
judge will decide a contested question of law-by analogical reasoning from the
fixed and accepted precedents.26 °
254. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of these principles to the
scenario).
255. See supra note 105.
256. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 60, at 1083 ("[A lawyer] should have ethical discretion to
refuse to assist in the pursuit of legally permissible courses of action and in the assertion of potentially
enforceable legal claims.").
257. Mark can imagine cases where that proposition is very evident. In such "easy" cases, Mark will have no
doubt that his duty would be to ensure that a family whom he has agreed to represent will receive his best efforts
to keep them from homelessness or painful hunger. Note that these easy cases do not imply Mark's commitment
to help every family that might suffer from hunger and for which some lawful relief is available. That
proposition is not an "easy" case at all, but instead contains competing principles, one of benevolence and the
other representing Mark's right to time of his own. The paradigm case that Mark calls up for his dilemma
involving Edna is one in which he has agreed to represent her. Note also that these paradigm cases need only be
Mark's; it is not necessary - although it will be likely - that they be shared by Mark's relevant community.
Mark's ethical conflict consists of his internal angst, and his "triangulation" can proceed using his own
commitments.
258. These questions echo William Simon's thoughtful assessment of a lawyer's obligation to assist a client
to obtain welfare benefits that seemingly are not permitted by the applicable regulations. Simon, Ethical
Discretion, supra note 60, at 1105-07.
259. Similarly (although beyond the defined scope of this Article), sometimes Mark will engage in civil
disobedience for the same reasons. See Judith A. McMorrow, Civil Disobedience and the Lawyer's Obligation
to the Law, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 139 (1991) (proposing a theory aligning civil disobedience and the lawyer's
proper role).
260. See Sunstein, supra note 111, at 744-49 (discussing the structure of analogical reasoning in law);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 77-90 (discussing analogical reasoning in the contexts of common, constitutional,
and statutory law).
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CONCLUSION
This Article's purpose has been to introduce to the world of legal ethics the
conception of casuistry, and to borrow from the rich world of bioethics insights
about case-based reasoning and clinical ethics that can inform the practice of law.
In many ways the ideas developed here are nearly self-evident. The claim by John
Arras and others that we are already practicing casuistry is a powerful one. We
are all casuists, as we use analogies and easy cases to make the best sense of
ethical conflict. The "new casuistry" helps us to identify the processes we use
and to offer a structure and some governing themes for those processes.
In other ways, though, the model expressed by casuistry undercuts much of the
rules- and principles-based syllogistic thinking that pervades much thinking and
writing within legal ethics. Those ordinary ways of confronting ethics are in great
need of refinement and rethinking, and this Article has shown how the wisdom of
the casuists might guide us in that task of refinement and rethinking. If the
casuists are right, this effort can aid plain persons to confront ethical complexity
in a meaningful way without needing to resolve, or even understand, more
sophisticated debates about moral philosophy.
If casuistry seems promising in these important ways, it also invites much
more reflection by critics and supporters within the legal profession. Central to a
critical assessment of casuistry are questions about conservatism and self-
interested decisionmaking. Crafting a method of ethical deliberation grounded in
considered judgments arising from cases risks privileging the status quo, and
seems to discourage innovative or progressive ethical thinking. It also permits, in
its resistance to blanket theories and principles, arguments about ethical propriety
that are intended to produce certain identified results-the very abuse that the
common understanding of "casuistry" has so often invoked in the past. These
risks of casuistry seemingly will not trump its apparent benefits, but they must be
confronted head-on if casuistry is to play a meaningful role in lawyers' ethical
decisionmaking.
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